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RÉSUMÉ 
Ce mémoire est écrit pour examiner la possibilité de la formation de l'identité 
collective entre les trois pays de l'Asie du Nord-Est, la Chine, le Japon et la Corée du 
Sud (CJK FTA), en mettant l'accent sur le rôle de l'accord de libre-échange trilatéral 
sur lequel une série de négociations sont en cours. 
En dépit de l'interdépendance économique croissante dans la région, il n 'y a pas 
encore un cadre institutionnel pour coordonner les intérêts. L'accord de libre-échange 
entre les trois pays est utilisé comme un outil d'analyse pour deux raisons. D'abord, 
cet accord de libre-échange trilatéral devrait un cadre institutionnel majeur pour la 
coopération économique comme un moyen de maximiser les avantages économiques 
pour les pays membres. La deuxième raison pour l'utilisation de CJK FT A dans cette 
recherche est parce qu ' il entraînera inévitablement des questions politiques et 
économiques auxquelles les pays de la région sont confrontés à l' égard des politiques 
différentes dans l'Asie de l'Est. 
Le cadre théorique de cette recherche est le constructivisme dans l'analyse de la 
formation de l'identité régionale. La raison de l'utilisation de ce cadre de théorie est 
pour savoir comment les pays de la région peuvent interagir pour former leurs intérêts 
et leurs préférences respectives au milieu de l'interdépendance économique croissante 
et de la coopération politique inactive. La méthodologie pour l'analyse de l'article est 
une analyse empirique des textes publicitaires et des données statistiques existantes. 
Cette recherche montre que, malgré les tensions incessantes dans le domaine de 
relation politique et de nationalisme croissant, certains résultats tangibles ont 
graduellement commencé à émerger dans le cadre de l'interdépendance économique 
et une série de négociations sur sa préparation. Le CJK FTA n'est pas encore lancé, 
mais il devrait établir des bases vers la création d'un sens de la communauté régionale 
et de la formation de l'identité collective en Asie du Nord-Est dans l'avenir. 
MOTS-CLÉS 
CJK-FTA, Asie du Nord-Est, constructivisme, identité collective, intégration 
régionale, nationalisme, régionalisme, régionalisation 
ABSTRACT 
This study aims to look into the possibility of the formation of collective identity among 
the three states in Northeast Asia, China, Japan and South Korea, by focusing on the 
role ofthe China-Japan-Korea Free Trade Agreement (CJK FTA) on which a series of 
negotiations are underway. 
Despite the growing economie interdependency in the region, there has yet to be an 
institutional framework to coordinate the interests. CJK FT Ais used as tool of analysis 
for two reasons. First, the trilateral FTA aims to become the first major institutional 
framework for economie cooperation as a means to maximize the economie benefits 
for the member states. The second reason is that CJK FT A will inevitably entai! 
political as well as economie issues that the states in the region are faced with amid 
differing policies in East Asia. 
Theoretical frame of this paper is constructivism in the analysis of the formation of the 
regional identity. The reason ofusing the frame oftheory, particularly the one defined 
by Wendt, is to find out how the regional states can interact to form their respective 
interests and preferences amid the growing economie interdependency and loose 
political cooperation. The methodology for analysis of the paper is an empirical review 
of existing literatures and records coupled with statistical study to date. 
This study will show that, des pite unrelenting tensions in the realm of poli ti cal relations 
and growing nationalism, sorne tangible outcomes have slowly begun to emerge in the 
course of economie interdependency and a series of negotiation over the preparation 
for the trilateral FT A. Although CJK FT A has yet to take off, it is likely to serve as the 
stepping-stone toward creating a sense of regional community and the collective 
identity in Northeast Asia in the visible future. 
KEY WORDS 
CJK FT A, constructivism, collective identity, regional integration, nationalism, 
regionalism, regionalization 
INTRODUCTION 
This study aims to look into the possibility of the formation of collective identity in 
Northeast Asia, with which current economie interactions in the region can develop to 
affect the realm of political and security cooperation. It will also review the reasons 
of the slow process of regional integration in Northeast Asia amid the increasing 
economie interdependency. In the course of research, this study will concentrate on 
the catalyst role of the China-Japan-Korea Free Trade Agreement (CJK FTA), of 
which a trilateral negotiation is underway, from the perspective of its influence to the 
formation of state identity, interests, preferences and ultimately the collective identity 
in Northeast Asia. 
The spatiotemporal scope of the research is the Northeast Asian states from the period 
ofpost-Cold War to present. Specifically, China, Japan and South Korea will be the 
statesfor analysis . Northeast Asia is a region that covers not just the three 
aforementioned states but includes Taiwan, eastern Russia, Mongolia and North 
Korea. However, this study will focus on the three states that are currently working 
on the trilateral FTA, whichis believed to create one of the most influential economie 
regions in the world.The strategie and economie weight of the Northeast Asian region 
in the global economy has gained importance in recent years. China already overtook 
J a pan in 2010 in terms of the General Domestic Produet (GDP) and became one of 
the 02 with the US . Japan has suffered "the lost twenty years" and is still struggling 
to reeover, but it maintains an absolute economie presence in the global economy and 
in East Asia, in particular. South Korea ranks sixteenth in the global economy. 1 The 
foreign eurrency reserves held by the three states represent 45% of the total. Besides 
1 World Development Indicators , (World Bank, 20 13); available from 
http: //data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD. 
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the three states, Taiwan is the 2ih economy in the world and the fifth largest holder 
of foreign reserves. As su ch, N ortheast Asia is gaining importance in both geo-
political and geo-economic sense.In Southeast Asia, there is the Association of South 
East Asian states (ASEAN), which bas already positioned itself as an influential 
entity in East Asia. The growth of ASEAN has attracted attention from many because 
its member states could overcome a number of disadvantages against integration 
ranging from historical conflicts, different polities, ideologies, and wide development 
gaps. It is sure that ASEAN will continue to function as an important factor in the 
process of regional integration of East Asian states.The example of successful 
formation of a regional group in Southeast Asia pro vides a useful insight to the future 
cooperation in East Asia.Northeast Asian states also reveal many differences when 
compared to ASEAN members in a political, economie and social sense. However, 
the influence of Northeast Asia on the global economy is much larger than that of 
ASEAN. Despite economie interdependency in the region, Northeast Asia has yet to 
develop a sense of regional community. The growing nationalism even makes it 
difficult for the regional states to come closer to one another. Thus, it can be useful to 
identify the reasons of the weak regional identity and explore ways for its 
development. In that respect, this paper will shed light on the on-going negotiations 
over CJK FT A for two reasons. First, the tri lateral FT A aims to become the first 
major institutional framework for economie cooperation as a means to maximize the 
economie benefits for the member states. The second reason is that CJK FTA will 
inevitably address the political positions of the member states amid their differing 
policies in East Asia. Thus, the progress on CJK FT A is likely to entail various forms 
of confrontation or coordination with regard to their interests, and lay the ground for 
the member states to work on the formation of regional identity. 
The theoretical frame of this paper is constructivism in the analysis of the formation 
of the regional identity in Northeast Asia. Specifically, such concepts as identity, 
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interests, and preferences defined by Wendt will be used in describing the situation in 
Northeast Asia. The reason of using this theoretical frame is to find out how the 
regional states can interact to form their respective interests and preferences amid 
growing economie interdependency and stalled political cooperation. There are other 
theories that can explain the current situation in Northeast Asia. Classical reali sts 
viewed the nature of the state would ultimately be based on the "manifestations of a 
struggle for power"? The most efficient way to maintain peace through international 
cooperation is the consent among states over the power balance.3 Neorealists bring to 
our attention two crucial factors, the possibility of defection and relative gains, which 
hinder cooperation among states. Grieco said that the concerns about relative gains 
make states unwilling to cooperate. 4When we rely on neorealism, maintaining the 
status quo can be the best solution one can expect, with all the confrontations 
existingamongstates. On the other hand, neoliberalists talk about the possibility of 
regional integration based on rational calculation of interests. Mitrany laid importance 
on cooperation in a non-political context and the functions of international 
organizations. 5 Neo-functionalists have focused on supranational interest groups as 
the driving force of integration while focusing on the possibility of the sense of 
community and the formation of common norms.6 
While these perspectives provide valid tools to analyze the issue of integration, we 
may find it a little difficult to fit the case of ASEAN into them. There is not a 
2Hans J. Morgenthau, Po/itics among Nations; the Strugglefor Power and Peace, 4th ed. (New York,: 
Knopf, 1967), p. 101. 
31bid., p. 167. 
4Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal 
Institutionalism," International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988), p. 499. 
5David Mitrany, A Working Peace System; an Argument for the Functional Development of 
International Organization, Post-War Problems (London, New York, Toronto etc.: The Royal Institute 
oflntemational Affairs; Oxford University Press, 1943), p. 35. 
6Emst B. Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process," International 
Organization 15 (1961) , pp. 366-392. 
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hegemonie power in the group nor is a social and supranational mechanism to 
encourage them to form common norms and systems to induce regional identity. 
However, ASEAN could form regional identity and successfully achieved integration 
by coordinating their interests through institutionalization. Just like the case of 
ASEAN, where the process of integration actually took place despite difficult 
physical conditions, we may find it useful to apply constructivist approach to 
Northeast Asia where identities and interests have yet to develop in to a regionallevel. 
This paper has adopted as methodology for analysis empirical reviews of existing 
literatures and records coupled with statistical study. Chapters 1 through 3review 
theories of regional integration and Northeast Asian identity, for which theoretical 
papers and various documented sources are used. For the current situation of the three 
Northeast Asian states introduced in Chapter 4, statistical data available from the 
World Bank, IMF and other research institutions in respective countries are used. 
Based on the findings on the above, we will look into the possibility of the formation 
of collective identity of the region and the expected role of the CJK FTA once it is 
launched in the coming years. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, we will look into the theoretical 
aspects of regional integration from economie, political and social perspective. We 
will then see the geopolitical importance of Northeast Asia, how it differs from other 
regional groups including the EU and ASEAN, confrontations and cooperation 
among regional member states, and the possibility of integration in the near future. 
We will then move on to the concept of collective identity and see how Northeast 
Asian regionalism and regional identity are defined. Here, we will review the 
economie, political and social interactions among the three states, with a focus on the 
least developed sense of comrnunity in the social area that strengthens the growing 
sentiments of nationalism. Building on the findings over North east Asian regionalism, 
5 
we will single out the talks over the CJK FTA, which has been one of the most 
sensitive issues for the three states, concentrating on the intentions of individual 
states. Then we will see how such differences among the three states represent the 
difficulties that lie in the path toward a successful launch of the agreement. Finally, 
we will look into what the CJK FT A can con tri bute to the formation of the base of 
integration in Northeast Asia, as the first institutional framework and the stepping-
stone toward a state where current progressing economie integration can "spill over" 
into political commitments. 
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CHAPTER I 
REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY 
In this chapter, we will first review the concepts of regionalization and regionalism, 
the two important concepts to discuss regional integration, and then various 
theoretical approaches toward regional integration on both economie and political 
fronts . After reviewing various explanations on the issue of regional integration, we 
will deal with the subject of collective identity from the perspective of liberalism, 
neo-realism and constructivism, with a view to develop our discussion toward an 
analysis of the prospect of formation of regional identity in Northeast Asia. 
1.1 Regionalization and Regionalism 
Regional integration can be defined as the process where states "voluntarily mingle, 
merge and mix with their neighbors so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty 
while acqumng new techniques for resolving conflicts among 
themselves."7Neofunctionalists tended to have normative position to hold an "implicit 
assumption that integration is a good thing".8 Regardless of the normative nature of 
the concept, the term "regional integration" is a complex notion. Karl Deutsch 
defined integration as: 
7Emst Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Aguish ofPretheorizing," 
International Organization 24, no. 4 (1970), p. 610. 
8Joseph S. Nye, "Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement," International 
Organization 22, no. 4 (1968), p.856. 
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( ... )the attainment, within a territory, of a "sense of community" and of 
institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a 
"long" time, dependable expectations of "peaceful change" among its 
population. 9 
Haas defined the concept ofintegration as "the process of attaining the terminal 
condition of political community" and stated further as follows: 
( ... ) the process whereby poli ti cal actors in severa! distinct national settings are 
persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectation and political activities to a new 
center whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing 
national states. 10 
Haas v1ews that "conflict resolution" is an indicator for judging the process of 
integration and gives us three types of compromise: 1) accommodation on the basis 
of the minimum common denominator; 2) accommodation by "splitting the 
difference"; and 3) accommodation on the basis of deliberately or inadvertently 
upgrading the comrnon interests of the parties. '' 
While reviewing the issue of regional integration, it may be necessary to discem two 
other concepts, regionalization and regionalism. Evans described regionalization as 
"the expression of increased commercial and human transactions in a defined 
geographical space", while regionalism is the e pression of "a common sense of 
identity and destiny combined with the creation of institutions that express that 
identity and shape collective action" . 12 Although these two terms are used 
9Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area; International Organization in the 
Light ofHistorical Experience, Publications of the Center for Research on World Political Institutions 
(Princeton,: Princeton University Press, 1957), p.2. 
10Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process", pp.366-367. 
111bid. , p. 367. 
12Paul Evans, "Between Regionalism and Regionalization: Policy Networks and the Nascent East 
8 
confusingly, regionalization usually refers to the phenomenon where economie 
activities are concentrated in a certain region. 13 The term regionalization may be 
interchangeable with interdependency or economie integration.Meanwhile, 
regionalism is a political process where economie policies are drafted or coordinated 
and its process "appears irreversible, no longer to be dismissed by critics as a mere 
fad". 14 The ultimate stage of regionalism will therefore be poli ti cal integration. In this 
context, Katzenstein defined the two concepts as: 
Regionalization describes a geographie manifestation of international or global 
economie processes. Regionalism refers to political structures that both reflect 
and shape the strategies of govemments, business corporations and non-
govemmental organizations and social movements. 15 
A region, according to Katzenstein, is a material object and social and cognitive 
constructs rooted in political practice. He went on to say that regions are "social 
constructions created through politics". 16 
Fawcett defines regionalism as a policy or project, while regionalization is both 
project and process. 17 According to this definition, regionalization may both precede 
and flow from regionalism. Regionalization is also defined as a bottom-up process 
within a specifie geographical area mainly by the market, private sector trade and 
Asian Institutional Identity," in Remapping East Asia, ed. T. 1. Pempel (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 2005), p. 196. 
13Samuel Kim, "Regionalization and Regionalism in East Asia," Journal of East Asian Studies 4 
(2004) , p. 40. 
14Louise Fawcett, "Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History ofRegionalism," 
International A.ffairs 80, no. 3 (2004) , p. 438 . 
15Peter 1. Katzenstein, "Regionalism and Asia," New Political Economy 5, no . 3 (2000) , p. 2. 
16Ibid. 
17Fawcett, "Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism", p. 433. 
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investment. 18 While the process of regionalization is spontaneous without rare 
intervention from the government, regionalism is the process that cornes from top to 
bottom and is led artificially by the government. 19 The fact that regionalism is driven 
as part of the intentional actions by the state is also supported by Baogang He, 
whostates"regionalism is a firm intellectual organization that is needed to deal with 
regional problems that the nation-states cannot or lack resources to solve."20Still, it is 
not easy to relate regionalizationsimply to economie integration and regionalism to 
political integration since the concepts ofboth political and economie cooperation are 
closely interrelated. For example, political cooperation can result from developing 
economie relations. Independent states can enter into cooperative relations without 
any government intervention and, as a result, can face various constraint factors that 
have barred them from working together. Realization of the existing constraint factors 
will then trigger the necessity to remove them, which calls for inter-government 
cooperation. Once governments enter into cooperative relations, it will be highly 
likely that the existing economie cooperation will gain pace. 
As such, both political and economie cooperation can function as catalyst to elevate 
cooperation. It may be easy to separate the concepts of political and economie 
relations in an abstract way, but it is hard to expect in the real world due to the 
blurred borders that separate them. Along with regionalism taking place worldwide, a 
new perspective emerged to describe the recent developments, particularly in East 
Asia, as "new" .21 With the new regionalism, people see something different in quality 
of the phenomenon compared to the past. The new regionalism is considered more 
18Hiroyuki Hosohiro, "Regionalization and Regionalism in East Asia," ISS Discussion Paper Series F-
162 (2013), p. 2. 
19Ibid. 
20Baogang He, "East Asian Ideas ofRegionalism: A Normative Critique," Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 58 , no. 1 (2004), p.119. 
21 Alice D. Ba, "Regionalism's Multiple Negotiations: ASEAN in East Asia," Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs 22, no. 3 (September 2009), pp. 3-4. 
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pluralist and inclusive of different actors and developmental expenences beyond 
Europe. 22 The new perspective of viewing regionalism, as upheld by Hettne et el.,23 
provided a tool to explain the development ofregionalism after the Cold War era and 
the beginning of globalization in full swing. Hettne summarized the differences 
between the old and the new regionalism as (1) whereas the old regionalism was 
formed in a bipolar Cold War context, the new is taking shape in a more multipolar 
world arder (2) whereas the old regionalism was created from outside and 'from 
above' (i.e. by the superpowers), the new is a more spontaneous process from within 
and 'from below' (in the sense that the constituent states themselves are main actors) 
(3) whereas the old regionalism was specifie with regard to objectives, the new is a 
more comprehensive, multidimensional process.24 The various ways of definition and 
classification of such terms as regionalism and regionalization can help us view the 
developments of regional integration particularly in East Asia. Given the diversity in 
the concepts and classification of the terms, this paper will adopt the term regional 
integration with more weight on the political aspects as delineated in the definition of 
regionalism as above. 
1.2 Theoretical approaches on regional integration 
1.2.1 Economie aspect 
Economie cooperation m general refers toexchanges of economie gams among 
particular states. These gains aim to materialize specifie economie goals pursued by 
the parties concemed. There are various actors involved in the process of economie 
22Ibid. 
23Bjo0 rn Hettne, Andras Inotai, and Osvaldo Sunkel, Globalism and the New Regionalism, 
International Political Economy Series New Regionalism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999). 
24Bjo0 rn Hettne and Andras Inotai , The New Regionalism: Implications for Global Development and 
International Security (Helsinki: The United Nations University/WIDER, 1994), pp. 1-2. 
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cooperation as well as diverse goals of such activities. The forrn and nature of 
cooperation differ from one relation to another, but it features preferential treatment 
exclusive to member states at regional level aiming at an eventual integration.It 
remains unclear, however, whether integration has to be used in a static or dynamic 
sense. Balassa defined economie integration as both a process and a state of affairs . 
According to him, economie integration in a static sense means the absence of 
various forrns of discrimination. As a process, economie integration encompasses 
measures designed to abolish discrimination. 25 If we choose to define regional 
economie integration as a process, as opposed to a static stage, the process of 
integration needs to have a goal to achieve. The static meaning of the expression will 
apply once the integration process reaches the final stage and achievesits 
goal.Economic integration as a forrn of economie cooperation is also defined 
variously. According to Molle, economie integration indicates the graduai elimination 
of economie frontiers among member states? 6üverall, economie integration refers to 
the static situation where discrimination is abolished, but it also emphasizes the 
"process" of the combination of previously separate economies into larger 
arrangements. The fonn of integrationis generally composed of the five stages, 27 
depending on the degree of interdependency among member states as shown 
hereunder. (Table 1.1) 
25Bela A. Balassa, The The01y of Economie Integration, Irwin Series in Economies (Homewood, Ill. ,: 
R.D. Irwin, 196 1), p. 174. 
26Willem Molle, The Economies of European Integration: Theory, Practice, Policy (Aldershot, Hants, 
England; Brookfield USA: Dartmouth Pub. Co., 1990), p. 95. 
27Balassa, The Theory of Economie Integration, p. 2. 
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Table 1.1 Five Stages of Economie Integration 
Free Trade Customs Co mm on Economie Complete 
Agreement Union Market Alliance Economie Integration 
Abolishment of tarifflnon-
tariff barri er 
Co mm on tariff against 
outsiders 
Customs union without 
limitations on factor 
mobility 
Unification of monetary, 
fiscal, social, and counter-
cyclical policies 
Binding supra-national 
organization 
A free trade agreement (FTA) calls for the abolishment of tariffs and other 
regulations of commerce on the products originating from the member states. 
Basically, FTA has the fo llowing three characteristics. First, despite the abolishment 
of intra-regional tariffs, member states maintain their individual tariff barrier against 
others. Secondly, member states can exercise independent trade policies as they 
determine their own extema1 trade policies. Lastly, ru1es of origin and domestic 
content requirements are imposed to prevent the effect of trade deflection where low 
tariff products from non-member state are exported to member states that maintain 
higher tariffs than non-member states. Customs Union also reduces or abolishes intra-
regional tariffs, but it imposes comrnon extemal tariff to non-member states. It is a 
form of economie integration in which member states adopt comrnon extemal trade 
policies. Common market takes one step further from Customs Union to create a 
single market by adding to these arrangements such factors as free movement of 
capital and labor. Current European Union and the East African Community (EAC) 
belong to this category. Complete economie integration is the final stage by adding 
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integrated economie policies. Once economie integration reaches this stage, the 
member stateshave no or negligible control of economie policy in both monetary and 
fiscal sectors. To carry out common monetary and fiscal policies, however, economie 
sovereignty of each member state has to be transferred to the supranational entity. 
Thus, a complete economie integration is only conceivable when each member gives 
up its sovereignty to the extent that a commensurate level of integration in political 
area becomes necessary. 
1.2.2 Political aspect 
There are two approaches in reviewing regional integration from the angle ofpolitical 
and security areas . The first one is an ideological approach that emphasizes 
cooperation among ideological groups of leftists, rightists, conservatives, radicals, 
etc? 8 One of the successful factors of the integration of Europe can be found in the 
cooperation between mid-leftists and mid-rightists, in particular, between the Labor 
Party of the United Kingdom and The Christian Democratie Union of Germany. 29It is 
therefore possible to view that the European regional integration is rationalized in 
terms of ideology. 30 Second approach is to utilize theoretical approaches m 
international relations that include notably liberalism, realism and constructivism. 
Liberalists v1ew the role of institutions as the core factor in regional integration. 
Veering away from the state-centric view of realists, liberalists lay emphasis on the 
28Hyungdo Ahn and Jehoon Park, "A Politico-Economic Approach to Northeast Asian Regional 
Cooperation: Search for a New Mode! and Korea's Strategies," in Policy Analysis (Seoul: Korea 
Institute for International Economie Policy, 2007), p. 79. 
29Hong Sik Cho, "ldeology and Political Forces on European Integration," The Korean Journal of 
International Studies 35 , no. 1 (1995), pp. 337-360. 
30Ibid. 
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roles played by intergovemmental organizations (IGOs), international non-
governmental organizations (INGOs), political groups and individuals. They are 
interested in how increasing transactions and contacts among various actors affect 
their attitudes and how institutions accelerate such process.31The functionalist views, 
which formed the mainstream of integration theories in the 1940s and 1950s, chose to 
highlight international activities in non-political areas, addressing economie, social, 
technical and humanitarian issues, as a way of maintaining peace. Functionalists 
embraced the idea thatinternational agencies would initially have to deal only with 
mere technocratie matters, whereas political decisions accompanied by consequences 
of redistributive effects for citizens and social groups would be achieved inter-
governmentally. 32 However, such a view has been under attack from outside that 
points to the fact that it is extremely di ffi cult, if not impossible, to set aside economie 
and social sectors from politics. It is hardly conceivable to expect a goverrunent to 
hand over to supranational institutions the issues that may affect their own political 
domain. In addition, the road to political integration lies not in functional integration 
in socio-economic realms but in integrating actions driven by political will. 
The neo-functionalism, which emerged in the 1950s, also emphasized the process in 
which cooperation in one sector spills over into different sectors. Haas ' concept of 
spillover is how increased cooperation between individual states necessitates 
integration in one policy area that subsequently has a knock-on effect, creating 
pressures for further integration in other policy areas.However, neo-functionalists 
were skeptical of the automatic spillover where economie integration evolves to 
induce political cooperation. They discerned already that integration does not proceed 
in a linear manner. Haas said,"integrative forces which flow from one kind of activity 
31Andrew Gambie and Anthony Payne, Regionalism and World Order (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1996), pp. 248-249. 
32Mitrany, A Working Peace System; an Argument for the Functional Development of International 
Organization, p. 37. 
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do not necessarily infect other activities, even if carried out by the same 
organization."33Spillover can be classified into two, depending on the areas where 
they take place. One is the functional spillover and the other is political one. 
Functional spillover is the expansion of the function of supranational organization, 
that is, their task expansion. 34 Political spillover is the expansion of the terri tory of 
political activities from domestic to supranational level. 35 This spillover at the 
political level is not a simple functional issue but is supposed to do more than create 
additional technical tasks and change attitudes, identity, and affect 
participants. 36 Liberalists 'views on regional integration led to the interdependency 
theory in the 1970s. Keohane and Nye said that the globalization brings higher 
interdependency, which damages economie autonomy causing vulnerability 
interdependency, which in turn tends to limit the usage of power among nations.37 As 
a result, states tend to rely less on power and more on peaceful measures. Increasing 
interdependency will contribute to the international peace. However, this 
perspectivehas been critiqued in that it overlooked the existence and potential of a 
nation-state while overestimating the influence of non-governmental actors. 
The classical realism that emerged as a response to the breakout of the Second World 
War and the following totalitarian ideology viewed the international relations in the 
state of anarchy. To them, human beings are not benevolent in their nature but 
egocentric and competitive. Sovereign states are the principal actors in the 
international system, and special attention is afforded to major power states as they 
33Haas, "International Integration : The European and the Uni versal Process", p. 373. 
34Emst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe; Political, Social, and Economie Forces, 1950-1957, The 
Library ofWorld Affairs, (Stanford, Calif.,: Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 289-31 3. 
35Ibid. , p. 306, p. 330. 
36Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 
International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998) , p. 887. 
37Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence : World Politics in Transition 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), pp. 11-21 . 
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have the most influence on the international stage. A state emphasizes the interest in 
accumulating power to ensure security in an anarchie world. Power is a concept 
primarily thought of in terms of material resources necessary to induce harm or 
coerce other states. The balance of power and policies to preserve it are inevitable and 
essential in stabilizing a society of sovereign nations.38 However, the classical realism 
is critiqued because the state is not the sole important actor and can be irrational. In 
addition, as it underestimated the impact of domestic poli ti cal factors to the actions of 
astate, it is viewed as having ignored low politics.39Neorealism came later as a result 
to make traditional realism more systematic by complementing its weak points. Waltz 
said that inter-government cooperation becomes limited in two aspects. First, a state 
fears that other states have more gains than it does; second, a state is concerned over 
dependence to others by means of exchange of goods and services. If a state 
specializes itself to a certain category of goods, it becomes more dependent to other 
states that can offer the goods it does not produce. Therefore, the fear of economie 
dependence prevents the state from entering into government-level 
cooperation. 40 Neorealists emphasize the difficulties of cooperation in the 
international system based on the Waltz' s idea. The difficulties come from two 
factors: the possibility of defection and the issue of relative gains. One cannot be sure 
if the other party will keep to the agreements and rules and will be devoid of 
measures to sanction if a defection actually occurs. Without a supranational authority 
in the relations among states, it is difficult to monitor counterparts and acquire 
relevant information. Worse still, there is no authority or means to sanction the other. 
This problem is not limited to the early stage of cooperation but throughout the 
existence of international system. The root cause of deterrence of cooperation, which 
38Morgenthau, Politics among Nations; the Struggle for Power and Peace, p.l 67. 
39Robert O. Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics, The Political Economy of International Change 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). 
4
°Kenneth N. Waltz, The01y of International Politics, Addison-Wesley Series in Po litical Science 
(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. , 1979), p.105 . 
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is worse than the fear of defection,is the issue of relative gains. Even though present 
cooperation can offer absolute gains to both parties, the relative gains may differ. 
Cooperation may be necessary to maintain power in balance, but concem for relative 
gains willlimit that cooperation because the information about other states' behaviors 
and interests is not easily obtained.Grieco argues that concems over relative gains 
greatly restrictthe number of possible agreements because all gains must be 
distributed in a manner that exactlypreserves the preexisting balance of power. He 
also mentions that a state will decline to join, will leave, or will sharply limit its 
commitment to a cooperative arrangement if it believes that partners are achieving, or 
are likely to achieve, relatively greater gains .41 Gilpin and Kindleberger point to the 
role of a hegemon in terms of cooperation among states. According to them inter-
state cooperation can happen with the leadership of a hegemon42that offers public 
goods to initiate or impose cooperation for the purpose of short-term gains or to 
stabilize the system. 
1.3 Constructivism and Collective identity 
Both liberalism and neo-realismadopt an interest-based approach in their analyses of 
state behaviors. They argue that the identity and interests of a state are given 
exogenously and rational choice is possible. Constructivists take a cognition-based 
approach and they view that it is possible for states to share positive social experience 
through interactions. For constructivists, the preference of actors with regard to 
regional integration 1s not only giVen exogenously but also created 
41Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal 
Institutionalism", p. 499. 
42Robert Gilpin and Jean M. Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 72-80. 
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endogenously. 43 Actors leam new norrns and values through continuous 
socialization.44 They then develop new identities and preferences. Ruggie explains 
that constructivism concems human consciousness.45The core concepts in the process 
of regional integration from this perspective thus are ideal ones such as ideas, norrns 
or identity rather than materialistic ones. 
While describing world politics, Wendt made it clear that it is "socially constructed," 
with two basic claims that "the fundamental structures of international politics are 
social rather than strictly material, and that these structures shape actors ' identities 
and interests, rather than just their behavior."46 He went on to say that the "structural 
idealism is the hard core of constructivism"47 and emphasized the significance of 
decision of social structure based on ideational attributes and formations of identity 
and interests. In this sense, constructivists insist that both structure and agent are 
considered altogether. To Wendt, states are the principal units of analysis for inter-
national political theory and the key structures in the states system are intersubjective, 
rather than material. State identities and interests are an important part constructed by 
these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature 
or domestic politics.48 As such, the core concept of constructivism is to view the state 
as an actor and the structure as a system both of which are intersubjective and co-
constructive. The state creates the system and in tum, the system affects the state. The 
43 Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and th International Stat ," The American 
Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (1 994) , p. 385. 
44Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make ofl t: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 
International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992), pp. 394-395 . 
45John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the Wo rld Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization, 
The New International Relations (London; New York: Routledge, 1998),p.33. 
46Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer 
1995), p. 71. 
47 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge Studies in International 
Relations (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.J. 
48Wendt, "Collective ldentity Formation and the International State", p. 385. 
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agent-structure problem is interrelated both ontologically and epistemologically. The 
ontological perspective "concerns the nature of both agents and structures and, 
because they are in sorne way mutually implicating, of their interrelationship."49 In 
relation to the ontological issues, Wendt described three concepts, individualism, 
structuralism, and structurationism. While the first two concepts, individualism and 
structuralism, are embraced by neo-realists and world system theorists, the 
structuationist approach "tries to avoid what are the negative consequences of 
individualism and structuralism by giving agents and structures equal ontological 
status."50 
Constructivists explain how integration can grow out of inappropriate material 
conditions. They suggest that the preferences of actors do not necessarily come 
exogenously but from within as weil. Actors go through a continuous process of 
socialization, in which they acquire the norms and values and form a new identity, 
which leads to the change of its own preference. Constructivism, which allows the 
possibility of change of endogenous preference, is useful to explain the reason that a 
state chooses to go for regional integration while incurring substantial limitation on 
its own sovereignty. Constructivism concerns the issue of "human consciousness," 
particularly "the role it plays in international relations and the implications for the 
logic and methods of social inquiry of taking it seriously."51 It is the ideas, norms and 
identity that are more important than materialistic factors when explaining the process 
of regional integration. Shared ideas and norn1s among states develop the process of 
institutionalization and form a new identity in the region. ldentity positions itself in 
the historie, poli ti cal and cultural context, and is regarded as one of the independent 
49 Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," International 
Organization 41 , no. 3 (1987), p. 339. 
50Ibid., p. 339. 
51 Ruggie, John G. , 1998, Constructing the World Policy: Essays on Institutionalization, London: 
Routledge,p. 33 . 
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variables that cause the changes in the structure and the behaviors of state actors. The 
concept of identity includes the process of "identification" within a group of actors 
and that of "differentiation"in relation to different group of actors . While explaining 
"social identity," Tajfel defined its concept as: 
( ... ) that part of an individual' s self concept which derives from his knowledge 
of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and 
emotional significance attached to that membership. 52 
Constructivism giVes explanation on the co-constructive relation between the 
structure and state actors based on such concept of identity. From that perspective, the 
international system as a structure is not independent of the behaviors of actors or the 
cultural relations among actors. So the role of identity, a cultural factor, becomes 
important in the context of the process of regional integration. State identity can be 
controlled at the international level. Moreover, ifthis state identity can be shared 
among other states, a collective identity is formed . 53 The formation of collective 
identity is accelerated by continued interactions and learning process. There will be 
the "positive identification with the welfare of another, such that the other is seen as a 
cognitive extension of the self rather than independent." 54 Therefore, continued 
interactions with other group of actors lay the ground for a community with newly 
defined collective interests. From this perspective, the regional integration can be 
achieved through the cognitive process whereby a collective identity is created. As 
such, the constructivism concentrates on improving the relations among actors and 
has them participate in a community. 
52Hemi Tajfel, Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psycho/ogy (Cambridge 
Cambridgeshire ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 198 1), p. 255. 
53Wendt, "Collective ldentity Formation and the International State",pp.384-396. 
54Ibid., p.386. 
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We have so far reviewed the theoretical aspects in relation to regional integration, 
with a focus on the different views among liberalism, neo-realism and constructivism. 
While both liberalists and neo-realists adopt an interest-based approach in explaining 
state behaviors, constructivists take a cognition-based approach painting out that it is 
possible for states to share positive social experience through interactions. This study 
will lay focus on the approach of such interactions that may lead to positive 
identification and ultimately accelerate the formation of collective identity in 
N ortheast Asia. 
CHAPTER II 
NORTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM 
This chapter will address the subject of how Northeast Asian regionalism has 
developed to date. For that purpose, we will first review the geographica1 
classification of Northeast Asia and see how it differs from the rest of East Asian 
region from geopolitical perspective. Then we will take the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) as the example of an institutional framework representing 
the efforts toward regionalism in East Asia. In the process, we will look at the recent 
history in relation to the formation of ASEAN in Southeast Asia and its development 
thereafter, before addressing how Northeast Asia can identify itself as a distinct 
region in East Asia. 
2.1 Northeast Asia in East Asian politics 
2.1 .1 Geographie definition 
The geographie definition of "East Asia"poses an ambiguity when we discuss 
economie integration in the region. There may not be any opponents to the idea of 
ASEAN+ 3 being the core member of East Asia. However, there are other nations that 
are not participating in the group. If an economie integration is the issue at hand, 
Taiwan is too big to set aside. Taiwan holds a substantial size of economy playing an 
important role not just in East Asian but also global economy as member of WTO 
and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Likewise, the cases of North Korea and 
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Mongolia have to be discussed in tenns of geopolitical importance regardless of their 
minor contribution to the global economy. From a geographical point of view, the 
East Asian economie region comprises the Northeast and Southeast economie regions. 
In the Southeast economie region, the ten members of ASEAN have already created 
FTA (AFTA) among themselves. Therefore, it would be safe to say that the East 
Asian economie region is composed of AFTA and Northeast economie region.The 
problem in classifying the region arises when we narrow the focus on Northeast Asia. 
In general, this tenn refers to the specifie area that includes China, North and South 
Korea, and Japan. Classifying "Asia" based on geographie and cultural aspects, the 
region refers to the part of Eurasian continent except Europe and the region, which 
belongs to the African continent. The UN categorizes Asia into five groups- central , 
eastern, southern, south-eastern and western Asia. 55However, wh en we use the term 
"Northeast Asia" there is no barometer that can eut out this region other than 
geographical meaning. Culturally, Northeast Asia overlaps with Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Vietnam. In the broad sense of geographie meaning, there are other 
countries to include such as Mongolia, North Korea and far-east part of Russia. This 
kind of classification does not fit into the meaning for which we usually use the term 
"Northeast Asia". Therefore, we can understand that the tenn Northeast Asia is used 
to highlight the region's geopolitical significance for the global political economy. 
Many features show the geo-political and geo-economic significance of the Northeast 
Asian region. Most of them are highly contentious and are directly related to the state 
interests of many countries. There are conflict issues generated from this region based 
on the state interests of surrounding countries. First, the US has been in pursuit of 
defending and strengthening its interests in the Asia Pacifie region since the Cold 
War era. Such policy was clearly manifested in its Engagement and Enlargement 
55Composition of Macro Geographical (Continental) Regions, Geographical Sub-Regions, and 
Selected Economie and Other Groupings, (United Nations, 2013 [cited February 2 2014]). 
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Strategy sin ce 1995. 56 Secondly, J a pan has maintained the intention to re vamp its 
military power amid concerns of neighboring countries. Thirdly, there is the pursuit 
of the three party military alliance among the US-Japan-South Korea initiated by the 
US despite a strong resistance from China, Russia and North Korea. Fourthly, the 
North Korean nuclear development issue has been all time high. What matters is that, 
despite increasing geopolitical conflicts, there is not a single institutional system to 
deal with the security issue. Only bilateral, as opposed to multilateral, relations57have 
existed to address these current issues. 
The Northeast Asian region can be described as part of the world where dynamic geo-
economic environment coexists with complex geopolitical issues. This is also a 
region where there is not a single institutional mechanism for economie and security 
cooperation, which is the primary hurdle to overcome before advancing toward 
regional integration. One of the preconditions to induce regional cooperation has to 
be a peaceful and stable environment surrounding the region. In that regard, it is 
crucial in Northeast Asia to set up an institutional frameworkwhere conflict issues 
can be addressed to create such environment. 
2.1.2 Formation of East Asian regionalism 
It was after the year 1997 when the issue of regionalism was first dealt with formally. 
With the experience of the Asian financial crisis that made the countries in the region 
realize the necessity of a regional entity for cooperation, regionalism began to 
56 Engagement and Enlargement Strategy, (The White House, 1994); available from 
http:/ /www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Intemational_ security _ affairs/other/641 . pdf. 
57 China and North Korea signed the Treaty ofFriendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Ju1y 
1961. Similar treaties exist between the US and South Korea (Mutual Defense Treaty Between the 
United States and the Republic ofKorea, October 1953) and between the US and Japan (Treaty of 
Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan, 1952). 
25 
develop in East Asia. The painfulexperience led to the creation of ASEAN Plus Three 
(APT, or ASEAN+3) together with such ideas as the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) 
and Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). The discussion over CJK FTA is situated on the 
extension of such developments and can be understood in this context, considering its 
expected role in keeping the region from extemal economie impacts by forming a 
substantiallevel of institutional co-work to integrate the Northeast Asian market. 58 
Participants to a bloc naturally expect more gains than losses when they decide to join 
it. East Asian states began to weigh seriously the gains from East Asian regionalism. 
They had tried to integrate thernselves into the global econorny before then and such 
efforts enabled them to experience high economie growth. The Newly Industrialized 
Economies (NIES) such as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, with 
lean natural resources and insufficient infrastructures could develop their economies 
by pursuing outward and rnarket-friendly policies. Following NIES, other economies 
such as Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia also adopted active export-oriented policies 
and reaped success. The positive experience in joining the global economy left them 
with little choice but integrate further into the global system. 
In fact, there were regional entities in which Asian nations participated even before 
the Asian crisis. For example, the Asia Pacifie Economie Cooperation (APEC) has 
upheld the value of "open regionalism"thatis open to non-regional countries. The 
once arnbitious initiative of the East Asia Economie Group (EAEG) proposed by 
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir was unwelcomed within the region because it 
was against the idea of open regionalisrn. 59 The idea of EAEG was, unlike that of 
58Won Geun Song, "Economie Significance ofCJK FTA and the Prospect ofNortheast Asian 
Economie Cooperation," in Significance ofCJK FTAfi'om Economie and Security Perspective and the 
Impacts on Achieving Peace in Northeast Asia (Seoul: Institute for National Security Strategy, 
September 20, 20 Il), p. 29 . 
59Hong Xiang Qin and Seung Rok Park, "Economie Relations among China, Japan and Korea and 
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APEC, to build a strictly regional organization to call for intra-regional cohesion and 
exclude the non-Asian states. It was designed to reinvigorate regional economies 
through trade liberalization and strengthen ties among member states so that they 
could deal with the US-led market arder with more bargaining power. 60 However, 
most of the countries in East Asia were concerned that an exclusive bloc in the region 
might result in more defensive regionalism in Europe and in North America. Tighter 
blocs in these regions meant higher barriers into these markets, in which the largest 
US market was included. As a result, the idea of open regionalism continued as a 
leading princip le for East Asia un til the breakout of the fi nan cial cri sis in 1997. 
The Asian financial crisis was a wake-up call for the long lasted perception of the 
regionalism based on an optimistic perspective in terms of economie development. 
The crisis, which first appeared in Thailand with subsequent hits in South Korea and 
Indonesia, served as a warning signal about the lack of capabilities within the region 
for crisis management. They began to find ways to complement the weak points and 
keep the region in stable condition by creating a pan-regional cooperative arder. 
There were efforts made in two directions: building up one or more new institutions 
to oversee available regional resources and power and strengthening existing system 
to that effect. 61 First, the efforts to consolidate regional resources and power resulted 
in the form of ties between ASEAN and the three states in Northeast region, i.e. , 
China, Japan and South Korea. At the 301h anniversary of ASEAN in November 1997, 
the heads of these three countries were invited and the ASEAN+3 Sumrnit 
Economie Cooperation in Northeast Asia," (Korea Economie Research Institute, 2005) , p. 142. 
60The initiative of the East Asia Economie Group (EAEG) was proposed for the frrst time in December 
1990 at the meeting with Li Peng, then Chinese Premier. La ter in Ju1y and October 1997 during the 
ASEAN ministerial meetings, the initiative was officially put on table. The title was changed to East 
Asia Economie Caucus in the process.Jia Jia Siau, "East Asian Regionalism: The Review of Original 
!dea of Asean+ 3 Concepts," Journal of International Development and Cooperation 18, no. 1 (20 11 ), 
pp. 69-7 1. 
61John Ravenhill, "A Three Bloc World?: The New East Asian Regionalism," International Relations 
of the Asia Pacifie 2, no. 2 (2002), p.177. 
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Conference took place. Sin ce then the ASEAN+ 3 have accelerated the pace of 
cooperation within the region. In October 1999, ASEAN+ 3 launched the East Asia 
Vision Group (EA VG), a revised version of the former EA VC before the annual 
conference. After the conference, the regional heads adopted the Joint Statement of 
East Asia Cooperation, which called for tighter cooperation on economie, political, 
social and other supranational issues. 62 In March 2001 , a new research institution, the 
East Asia Study Group (EASG), began to function with a purpose of achieving East 
Asian vision specified in the report paper by EA VG. The report classified into a mid 
and long-term project the creation of the East Asia Free Trade Agreement (EAFTA) 
and regional financial facility, and upgraded the ASEAN+3 Summit Conference into 
the East Asia Summit Conference (EAS). ASEAN and the three Northeast Asian 
states agreed in September 2004 agreed to work on the creation of the East Asia Free 
Trade Zone (EFTZ) and began a research project participated by both private and 
government sectors. In 2005, the first EAS was convened in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 
participated by ASEAN+3 and India, Australia and New Zealand. These 
developments showed th at a new wave of regionalism was in the making in East Asia. 
There were movements toward institutionalization as weil. In November 1997, the 
fourteen economies 63 in the Asia Pacifie region launched the Manil a Framework 
Group (MFG) and began a series of meeting among national treasuries and central 
banks. From October 1998, ministerial level financial meetings took place semi-
annually to discuss macro-economie and sectoral policies. In May 2000, financial 
ministers of ASEAN+ 3 gatheredinChiang Mai, Thailand, at an annual meeting of 
the Asian Development Bank and agreed on the ChiangMai Initiative (CMI), which 
produced a multilateral currency swap arrangement. Under this arrangement, the 
62Joint Statement of East Asia Cooperation, (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1999); available 
from http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-pacilasean/pmv99 l lljoint.html. 
63Members are composed of Australia, Brunei, Canada, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South 
Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and the United States. 
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members of ASEAN+3 made a pool of foreign exchange reserves worth USD 120 
billion which they could draw within the pre-arranged limits whenthey happen to 
experience liquidity shortage. The pool was extended to USD 240 billion in 2012. 
The CMI was a significant tumaround for the members in their efforts to solidify 
cooperation in the financial area. It was actually a substantial alternative to the Asian 
Monetary Fund (AMF), which came out at the height of the Financial Cri sis but could 
not be materialized. Advocates including mostly ASEAN and South Korea welcomed 
the idea of AMF. 64 However, the emergence of AMF was considered as a threat to the 
US-led order in the global financial market and a significant challenge to IMF' s 
authority and work efficiency. Most of all, the US took the idea of AMF as an attempt 
to challenge US leadership in the financial and monetary area and rejected it. 65 The 
abortion of AMF could be partly due to the feeble leadership 66 Japan maintained 
during the time by failing to win over a full support from the regional states. Still , the 
negotiation over AMF ultimately resulted in a multiple cooperative mechanism. The 
Chiang Mai Initiative came as the first form of financial cooperation and proved the 
necessity of a doser relationship among the states in East Asia.67 
Another salient movement that hastened the pace of regionalism in Asia was the 
boom of the free trade agreements. South Korea agreed with Chi le in November 1998 
over concluding an FTA. Japan began to talk with Mexico to pursue a bilateral 
agreement. Singapore and Japan also began non-official talks for a bilateral trade 
agreement. China made an official announcement that it began negotiation with 
64Kent Calder and Min Ye, "Regionalism and Critical Junctures: Explaining the "Organization Gap" in 
Northeast Asia," Journal of East Asian Studies 4 (2004) , p. 209. 
65Qin and Park, "Economie Relations among China, Japan and Korea and Economie Cooperation in 
Northeast As ia", p. 143. 
66Nam-Koo Lee and Nak-Doo Sung, "A Study on the Financial Cooperation in East Asia," The Journal 
ofEurasian Studies 3, no. 5 (2005), p. 96. 
67Jun Hyup Kim, "Conditions and a Process ofDevelopment for Economie Integration in ASEAN+3," 
The Southeast Asian Review 21 , no. 3 (201 1), pp. 227-230. 
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ASEAN over FTA at the summit conference during ASEAN+3 in 2001. ASEAN 
members joined the wave in full force. Beginning with New Zealand in November 
2000, Singapore showed the most active movement in signing FT As with its 
counterparts including the European Free Trade Association, J a pan, Australia, the US 
India, Jordan, South Korea and Panama. The series of FTA were exceptional , 
considering the fact that there was not a similar agreement within the region before 
the Asian Crisis except for the case of ASEAN, which had proceeded with a free 
trade zone itself. The race toward FT A in East Asia can be explained by the "domino 
effect"68 or the "band wagon effect"69 where a state joins the race out of fear of being 
left out. The booming FT As influenced even Mongolia that had no previous record of 
agreement to begin its negotiation with Japan in 2012.70 The level of agreements and 
the coverage under the agreements differ from one country to another in East Asia, 
however, the successive creation of cooperative networks bas become extremely 
complex and diverse as the term "spaghetti bowl phenomenon"71 implies . 
2.1.3 Northeast Asia versus ASEAN 
Contrary to Northeast Asia, the Southeast Asian states have already proceeded with 
regional cooperation, as represented by ASEAN. ASEAN is working on its roadmap 
with a vision to create a single market and production base and balanced economie 
68Richard Baldwin, "A Domino Theory ofRegionalism," in NBER Working Paper Series (Cambridge, 
MA. U.S.: National Bureau ofEconornic Research, September 1993), pp. 2-3. 
69Soo Y eon Kim, "Regionalization in Search ofRegionalism: Production Networks and Deep 
Integration Commi tments in Asia's FT As," in Annual meeting of the International Political Economy 
Society (Claremont, CA. U.S .: October 25-26, 2013), p. 4. 
10The First Round ofNegotiationfor the Mongolia- l apan Economie Partnership Agreement (JMEPA) 
Held, (Ministry ofEconomy Tracte and Industry of Japan, 2012); available from 
http://www.meti .go.jp/english/press/20 12/0607 _ 0 1.html. 
71 Jagdish Bahgwati, "US Tracte Po licy: The Infatuation with FT As," Discussion Paper Series 726 
(1995) , p. 4. 
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development. The foundation of ASEAN dates back to 1967. Started as· political 
cooperative body, ASEAN has increased intra-regional economie cooperation by 
means of preferential trade agreements (PT As) and industrial cooperative programs. 
In the 1990s, it set a goal of creating the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). The 
financial crisis in late 1990s and the emergence of China as a global economie power 
pushed ASEAN to come up with a goal of creating an economie community in the 
region. The level of economie integration in Southeast Asia, however, has not been 
satisfactory. Although the free trade area is already in place, there are still substantia1 
amount of items that are not included in the agreement and the usage level of 
preferential tariff is stilllow.72 Even the creation of manufacturing base is mostly led 
by multi-national corporations. Besides, although there are efforts for a balanced 
economie development among member states, ASEAN has yet to narrow the 
development gaps among them. The measures to control foreign exchange flows to 
prevent financial crisis from repeating are mostly initiated by the Northeast Asian 
states, not within ASEAN. It was Japan, for example, that proposed the idea of the 
Asian Monetary Fund (AMF). Also, the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) relied heavily 
on the contributions from the three Northeast Asian states, of which the total 
contribution was four times that ofthe ten ASEAN states combined. (Table 2.1) 
Table 2.1 CMI Financial Initial Contributions 
$ Billion Share (%) 
CJK (3) 96.00 80 
72Reported reasons for not using FT As- the most significant reason being a Jack of information on 
FT As (45%), followed by low margin of preference (26%), delays and administration costs associated 
with rules of origin (25%), existence of export processing zones and the Information Technology 
Agreement (11 %) and nontariff barriers (9%). (Siow Yue Chia, ADB Working Paper Series, No. 210, 
2010) 
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China 38.40 32 
Japan 38.40 32 
S. Korea 19.20 16 
ASEAN (10) 24.00 20 
ASEAN+3 (13) 120.00 100 
* Source: The Joint Media Statement of the 1 ih ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers' Meeting, 3 May 
2009, Bali, lndonesia. (adjusted) 
More importantly, labor force is not permitted to move free1y within the region. The 
reason that explains ASEAN's loose level of integration is the wide intra-regional 
development gaps, 73 which make it hard for its member states to find common 
problems and corning up with common interests while working together. However, 
ASEAN has followed the path of the regional cooperation successfully in East Asia 
despite the difficulties of diverse leve! of economie development, culture and 
language differences. It will continue to lay emphasis on creating "ASEAN Centrality" 
in the formation of a new order in East Asia. Future development of ASEAN, 
however, will be influenced by the development in Northeast Asia, considering the 
size of economy and political weight the it carries.(Table 2.2) At present, there seern 
to be a couple of options for ASEAN to pursue a free trade area in East Asia: 
integrating the three ASEAN+ 1 FT As into one; and corn bining the CJK FT A and 
ASEAN. 
73Chang Ku Byun, "ASEAN Identity and Regional Integration: A Constructivist Approach," Korean 
Political Science Review 18, no. 2 (20 11 ),p. 11. 
Table 2.2 Basic Indicators: ASEAN vs.Northeast Asia 
Population GDP GDP Per Person Growth Rate 
(Thousand) (USD bil) (USD) (%) 
Brunei 409 11 27,390 2.8 
Cambodia 14,953 12 795 6.7 
Indonesia 248,256 731 2,946 6.4 
Laos 6,586 8 1,177 8.3 
Malaysia 29,180 244 8,373 5.2 
Myanmar 54,585 46 832 5.5 
Philippines 103,775 222 2,140 3.7 
Singapore 5,353 220 41 ,122 4.9 
Thailand 67,091 309 4,608 0.1 
Vietnam 91 ,519 112 1,224 5.8 
Total (ASEAN) 621,667 1,9 15 
China 1,344,130 6,989 5,183 9.2 
Japan 127,827 5,855 45 ,774 -0 .9 
South Korea 49,779 1,164 23 ,749 3.6 
Total (N.E. Asia) 1,521,736 14,008 
(Sources: Rearranged based on statistics available from ASEAN Statistics, The World 
Bank Group (2012). 
2.2 Cooperation in Northeast Asia and its limitation 
2.2.1 Political fragmentation with integrating economies 
32 
Despite growing interactions, the East Asian regionalism is not solid enough to pull 
individual nations together. One of the reasons of the weakness lies in its 
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characteristics of a statist preoccupation about sovereignty. Unlike Europe, where 
partial transfer of sovereignty and strong institutional framework are achieved, the 
East Asian states have not yielded on sovereignty issues, slowing down the formation 
of regional identity. Therefore, it can be said that the East Asian regionalism is for the 
benefit of nation-state not for the region itself. 74 Security issue cornes first for the 
East Asian states and they are not prepared to give up their sovereignty. Besides, 
concems over insecurity undermine the formation of friendly relations, which prevent 
the growing interdependency in the economie sector from growing into social and 
political sectors. Specifie examples of the source of insecurity include the 
confrontation between North-South Koreas, conflicts over territories throughout the 
East Asian maritime regions,75 and the growing influence from China in Southeast 
Asia. Such tensions have led tothe creation of bilateralsecurity alliances between the 
US and South Korea and between the US and Japan instead of multilateral security 
agreements as in the case of NATO in Europe. In the case of ASEAN, the issue of 
non-intervention is one of the supreme conditions of the organization.As a result, the 
East Asian regionalism usually takes the form of material exchanges within the 
region, FT A, and a security dialogue without political commitment. 76 
In a broad sense, there are more fundamental reasons that explain why regionalism 
remains at a basic level in East Asia. Focusing on Northeast Asia, it has to be 
emphasized that, after the Second World War, China, Japan, two Koreas and Taiwan 
maintained a form of somewhat limited military sovereignty amid the US-Soviet 
74He, "East Asian Ideas ofRegionalism: A Normative Critique", p. 120. 
75Chinais in the middle of disputes with four Southeast Asian states--:-Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines 
and Vietnam over the Spratly and Paracel island groups in the South China Sea. In the East China Sea, 
China, Japan, and Taiwan each claim an island group calledSenkaku by Japan, Diaoyu by China and 
Diaoyutai Islands by Taiwan. Other territorial disputes exist between Japan and South Korea in the 
East Sea/the Sea of Japan, and between China and South Korea in the Yellow Sea. 
76He, "East Asian Ideas ofRegionalism: A Normative Critique", pp. 118-119. 
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confrontation. 77 Their relations at an international lev el were managed in accordance 
with the interests of the two powers, the US and the Soviet Union. This tradition 
became the largestobstacle against the formation of regionalism in East Asia, 
particularly in the Northeast region. The weight of the US power remains active in 
this region, which signifies that US interestsin Northeast Asia will continue to 
function as one of the most important variables that affect North east regionalism. The 
structure of bilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia with the US playing the 
central role poses several problems. First, the bilateral security order shows a stable 
relation between the US and its counterparts, however, when it cornes to the relations 
among other US counterparts, there is not a binding frame for cooperation. It is not 
easy for Japan and South Korea, for example, to make cooperative efforts because of 
the mutual disbelief and their different views over the past history. In addition, asthe 
bilateral cooperative relations over security were initiated by the US, it influences the 
relations with a strong leadership. 78 Moreover, the bilateral security relations cannot 
address efficiently the instability caused by the changing power relations. China' s 
growing economie and military strengths have been addressed with efforts to balance 
powers among related parties in the form ofindividual alliances with the US by Japan 
and South Korea due to the lack of a multilateral framework. 79 Another salient 
characteristic of the East Asian regionalism is that it has been led by the market 
force. 80 While EU was led by the govemments with official, top to bottom and 
supranational co-efforts, East Asia shows a loose form of network with limited 
77Soung Chu! Kim, "Significance of China-Japan-Korea FT A in the Economie and Security Sec tors 
and Its Impact on Building a Peace Structure in Northeast Asia," (Institute for National Security 
Strategy, 2011), p. 69. 
78Ibid., p.70. 
79Kap-Sik Kim, "Northeast Asian Regional Security Paradigm and the North Korea Nuclear Issue," 
The Korean Journal of Unification Affairs 52 (2009), pp. 2-3 . 
8
°Chang Jae Lee, "Rationale for Institutionalizing Northeast Asian Economie Cooperation and Sorne 
Possible Options" (paper presented at the Strengthening Economie Cooperation in Northeast Asia, 
Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S ., August 16- 17, 2001), p. 10. 
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administrative organization, signifying that although the economie logic plays an 
important role in East Asia, a form ofbinding institutionalization has yet to emerge. 
The current situation in East Asia can be viewed from the perspective of the New 
Medieval order, an explanation of the new order in the global era that brings about 
fundamental changes in the modern state system. The New Medievalism is described 
as "a new concept that highlights the blurring dividing lines between domestic and 
foreign policies, double loyalties and overlapping realms of power." 81Hedley Bull 
later elaborated the concept of the New Medievalism by describing that the dominant 
order of the Medieval Europe was theocratie political system and that the New 
Medieval order is not a return to the medieval era but a "secular reincarnation of the 
system of overlapping or segmented authority that characterized Medieval 
Christendom." 82 With regard to the relation among sovereign states and other 
important actors in world politics, Bull said: 
It is obvious that sovereign states are not the only important actors or agents in 
world politics. The mere existence in world poli tics of actors other than the state, 
however, does not provide any indication of a trend toward a new medievalism. 
The crucial question is wh ether the inroads being made by these 'other 
associations ' .. . on the sovereignty or supremacy of the state over its terri tory 
and citizens is such as to make that supremacy unreal, and to deprive the concept 
of sovereignty of its utility and viability. 83 
The New Medieval order is a phenomenon where supranational integration 
movements take place on top and, at the lower level, state' s exclusive jurisdiction 
becomes reduced with the movements for separation by sub-state level organizations. 
81 Amold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration; Essays on International Politics (Baltimore,: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1962), pp.24 1-242. 
82Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study ofOrder in Wo rld Politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1977), p. 254. 
83Ibid., pp. 254-255 . 
36 
International institutions such as WTO, U.N., IMF and the World Bank 
haveexpanded their coverage. Amid the globalizing environment, there came regional 
responses in the fonn ofNAFTA, EU, APEC, Mercosur, GCC, ASEAN and so forth, 
creating a plural order of govemance. Sub-state level networks have been on the 
increase as well. There are also grey areas, expanding in such areas as international 
terrorism and criminal organization where a single state power cannot reach. 
Drawing on the concept of New Medievalism, Tanaka categorizes the world into 
three regional groups based on the two universal ideologies : democracy and market 
economy. 84 The first group is so-called "Neo-Medieval Sphere" where both 
democracy and market economy are well developed. This group includes Western 
Europe, North America and OECD member states. The second group is categorized 
as "Modem Sphere" where either one of the two ideologies is in a state of 
imperfection. In this region, the realist international order applies. The third group is 
the "Chaotic Sphere", where both democracy and market economy have yet to 
develop. From Tanaka' s perspective, East Asia belongs to the second regional group, 
with diverse polities and advancing market economy. In other words, East Asia is a 
region where modem and new medievaleras co-exist. Such categorization can be 
compared with Wendt's description of the three different cultures of anarchy 
depending on the inter-state cooperation: Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian. 85 Unlike 
Europe where states have already stepped into a Kantian type of culture, East Asia 
remains in the Lockean state, 86 with a mixture of hostility and cooperation.The 
characteristics that describe the Modem Sphere of the world can readily apply to 
Northeast Asia, where the remnants of the Cold War era are still in function while 
free market economy is gaining pace all over the region. 
84Akihiko Tanaka, The New Middle Ages (International House of Japan, 2002),pp. 154-1 73 . 
85Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, pp. 246-308. 
86Terence J. Vance, "Constructing a Regional Order: Northeast Asia and the Systemic Constraints on 
Korean Unification" (Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), pp. 67-68 . 
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2.2.2 Lack of leadership 
2.2.2.1 Competition over leadership between China and J a pan 
Another constraint factor standing in the way of regional integration in Northeast 
Asia is the lack of leadership. The two major powers, China and Japan, have not 
shown sufficient leadership in this sense. There has been a cooperative momentum 
building in East Asia, or Northeast Asia in particular amid the environment of 
growing economie development since the end of the Cold War. However, tensions 
have mounted as both China and Japan rely on their massive economie status in the 
global society and hope to shape the integration into their own scheme. Aside from 
the China-Japan relationship, there are other constraint factors that slow down the 
movements toward integration such as the Jack of poli ci es toward cooperation and the 
influence coming from the US . While explaining cooperation among nations, 
Keohane pointed out: 
If discord is to be limited, and severe conflict avoided, governments' policies 
must be adjusted to one another. That is, cooperation is necessary. One way of 
achieving such mutual policy adjustment is through the activities of a hegemonie 
power, either through ad hoc measures or by establishing and maintaining 
international regimes that serve its own interests while managing to be 
sufficiently compatible with the interests of others to be widely accepted. 87 
In the case of EU, there were strong will and efforts of France and Germany, the two 
economie powers. For the successful launch of NAFTA, the role of the US was 
instrumental. Likewise, Brazil and Argentine led the discussion over Mercosur into a 
87Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony : Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), p.243 . 
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success. 88For China, regional stability is crucial for its continued growth and would 
not risk undermining its trade and investment relations with others. Since the initial 
framework agreement with ASEAN in 2002, China has actively pursued regional 
cooperation. The pursuit of close regional cooperation by China has been in line with 
its foreign po licy that aims at growth of the Chinese economy. In other words, China 
needs a stable relation with its neighboring states including Japan to achieve its goal 
of economie development. 89 On the part of Japan, itwants to maintain a good and 
stable relation with China in consideration of the huge Chinese market for investment 
and trade. 90 With the perception of mutual interests, the two powers will have no 
other choice but hammer out some ways to cooperate. However, contrary to this 
optimistic hypothesis, there are the chronic mutual distrust and differing views over 
their history, all of which have caused instability in the region. On the security front, 
China is suspicious of the US-Japan Security Treaty as it has China as the potential 
target. The end of the Cold War could have dissolved the treaty long ago . However, 
the military relation between the US and Japan has become closer than ever. Japan is 
suspicious of China' s intention of becoming the regional hegemonie power based on 
the growing economie and military strengths. Many in Japan view the growing 
wealth of China backed by its vast pool of low-cost labor willhollow out Japan ' s 
industry and China's large and modernizing nuclear-armed military will threat Japan's 
national security.91The mutual distrusts have prevented both China and Japan from 
taking leadership in installing a regional institutional mechanism. Japan has relied on 
regional cooperation to secure its economie stability on one hand. On the other hand, 
Japan has utilized its cooperative relations with others to keep China under control, as 
88Ahn and Park, "A Politico-Economic Approach to Northeast Asian Regional Cooperation: Search for 
a New Mode! and Korea's Strategies", p. 35 . 
89Gyoo-Sang Seo!, "East Asian Economie Integration and Its Limit: Focusing on Approaches to 
Regionalism and Leadership Capacity of China and Japan," The Korean Association of Area Studies 
24, no. 3 (2006), pp. 121-1 22. 
90Ibid. , p. 130. 
91Edward J. Lincoln, East Asian Economie Regionalism (Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign 
Relations; Brookings Institution Press, 2004), p.240. 
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shown by its active participation in the regional cooperation within the framework of 
ASEAN+3. Moreover, Japan consistently made efforts to have India, Australia and 
New Zealand into the East Asian Summit to counterbalance China's growing 
influence in East A si a. 92 
2.2.2.2 Lack of poli ci es for integration 
Another reason that explains the lack of regional leadership in economie integration 
in East Asia is based on the fact that there are no coherent poli ci es in any of the two 
major powers, China and Japan, to that effect. In China's case, the leadership issue is 
challenged more from its domestic factors. China has pursued economie development 
while maintaining a stable management of relations with neighboring countries amid 
its competition with Japan. China signed a free trade agreement with ASEAN and 
participated in the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 
November 2002 and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) 
in November 2003 . With all these efforts, China aimed at changing its hostile image 
perceived in the region. In Northeast Asia, China has played a crucial role as a 
conciliator for the multilateral approach on the North Korean nuclear issue. lt may be 
early to say that these efforts have planted confidence in China, but its efforts have 
been successful to position itself as aninfluential entity in East Asia.Contrary to the 
externat achievements, there are areas to be addressed in domestic issues. he case in 
point is the instability with regard to the transition into a full market economy. China 
has pursued capitalistic economie policies after the Chinese government adopted the 
reform and open policy in 1978 when the Communist Party of China under the 
leadership of Deng Xiao Ping. However, on the political front it still maintains 
socialist polity. The Chinese economy system is so-called "state capitalism", a system 
92Takashi Terada, "Directional Leadership in Institution-Building: Japan's Approach to ASEAN in the 
Establishment ofPECC and APEC," The Pacifie Review 14, no. 2 (2001) , p. 8. 
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in which the statefunctions as the leading economie actor and uses markets primarily 
for political gain.93 The state capitalism shows the existence of close ties between 
those who govem thecountry and those who run its enterprises. Although the Chinese 
govemment advocates a comprehensive market principle, it is hardly conceivable to 
expect a country where a widespread govemment intervention exists to exert 
leadership over others where market economy functions. The strong influence by the 
Chinese govemment on the eco nom y sector has been the base of inefficiency in state-
owned enterprises, oversized central bureaucracy and financial institutions with buge 
debts.94Despite a series reform measures introduced to the private sector economy at 
a considerable level, the Chinese govemment still takes an active role in guiding 
development in close co-operation with business interests.95 
Meanwhile, J apan has not gained sufficient trust from regional members . That is 
because J apan has not assured them of its will to pro vide public goods as a leader. 
Sorne find the reason of insufficient support from the region from the negative 
perception held by the regional members about the past history. Specifically, the 
memory of the so-called Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere still lingers and, if 
Japan cornes up with another initiative of integrating regional economy, that action 
could be perceived as another attempt to ad vance into the region. 96 However, the 
negative perception about the history is insufficient to explain Japan's feeble status as 
a leader. In fact, Japan has poured efforts to improve its image since the Fukuda 
Takeo announced the so-called "Fukuda Doctrine"97 in 1977 with success to sorne 
93Ian Bremmer, "State Capitalism Cornes of Age," Foreign Affairs (May/June 2009). 
94Katzenstein, "Regionalism and Asia", p . 8. 
95Clem Tisdell, "Economie Reform and Openness in China: China's Development Policies in the Last 
30 Years," Economie Analysis & Policy 39, no. 2 (2009) , p. 287. 
96Terada, "Directional Leadership in Institution-Building: Japan's Approach to ASEAN in the 
Establishment ofPECC and APEC", p.202. 
97In 1977 the then Prime Minister Fukuda announced his doctrine, which became the general principle 
of Japan ever since in Japan's relations with East Asian states. The doctrine proposes: (1) Japan would 
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extent. The cause of distrust lies in the fact that East Asian states do not fully 
sympathize with Japan' s East Asia policy.98 Japan has failed to provide a reliable 
policy to share benefits with East Asian states and does not seem willing to do so. 
Japan' s unwillingness to support fundamentally the East Asian region was shown 
later by its passive role in the face of the IMF' s structure adjustment policiesduring 
the financial crisis in 1997.99Japan' s policy toward East Asia is more likely a strategie 
approach to nurture its own benefits based on its East Asian policy with which it 
maintains a doser tie with the US and counter the rising Chinese influence in the 
region. The East Asian community that Japan designs will not harm the US-Japan 
alliance and any other states, with the possibility open for the US to voice its opinion 
in the regional developments. 100 The increased number of EAS member states, 
including Australia, New Zealand and India, can be seen as part of such efforts by 
Japan to strengthen its relations with the US and counterbalance the growing 
influence from China.101 Japan has wanted since long ago to play the central role in 
East Asia while the nations in the region perform their function of supporting its 
industrial strategy. The highest priority for Japan has been to create and maintain a 
favorable environment for its economie dominance, and its East Asian policy was 
unfurled in that context. 102 For Japan, the strategie value of East Asia is the reliable 
never become a military power and would work to promotepeace and prosperity in Southeast Asia; (2) 
lapan would build relationships withgovernments in the region based on mutual trust; and (3) lapan 
would workcooperatively with ASEAN through an equal partnership to strengthen regionalsolidarity. 
98Chang-Soo Jin, "Japan's 'East Asian Community Initiative'- Progress, Issues and Response from 
South Korea," Sejong Policy Research 20 11-1 5 (20 11),p. 10. 
99 Japan was the largest lender with a Joan of USD 260 billion in 1996 to Asian nations, which was the 
largest market for investment and export. The fmancial crisis in the region could be a significant threat 
to lapan and made Japanese financial institutions rush to collect their credits aggravating the situation 
during the period of crisis. 
100Gi-Seok Kim, "Japan's Policy of East Asian Regionalism: ASEAN+3, EAS and East Asian 
Community," National Strategy 13, no. 1 (2007),p. 76. 
101Ibid., p. 77. 
102Christopher W. Hughes, "Japanese Policy and the East Asian Currency Crisis: Abject Defeat or 
Quiet Victory? ," CSGR Working Paper 24, no. 99 (1999), p.3. 
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supplier of resources and a market for Japanese products. The Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) and direct investments from Japan have greatly contributed to the 
economie growth of the nations in the region. However, critics point to the fact that 
Japan' s ODA has been used not so much to help developing countries asto advance 
Japan's own economie interests. Also, thebigger part of Japan 's ODA is allocated to 
motivate commercial interests and induce profits for Japanese companies. 103 
2.2.2.3 US influence 
There are severa! other factors that have slowed down the process of regional 
integration in Northeast Asia in addition to those listed on the above. For example, 
there are the development gap between China and Japan, differences in political and 
economie system, and lack of trusts deri ving from di sputes over territorial history 
issues. Another factor to be considered in that respect is the influence of the US.The 
US has been keen about China's growing influence in Asia Pacifie. The Sino-
American relation carries significance, as it affects not just their bilateral issues but 
East Asian regional and even global issues as weil. China became the second largest 
economy in the world, after overtaking J a pan in 2010, representing the most salient 
advancement among the so-called "Ri se of the Rest" in the 21 st century. China made 
an offer to the US to maintain a "New Type of Major Country Relationship (xinxing 
dagua guanxi)" during the fourth round of the Strategie and Economie Dialogue 
(S&ED) held in Beijing in May 2012. In February 2012, then presumptive President 
Xi Jinping proposed four ways for the United States and China to build a new type of 
relationship based on four principles: 1) steadily increase mutual understanding and 
strategie trust, 2) respect each other's core interests and major concerns, 3) work hard 
to deepen mutually beneficiai cooperation, and 4) steadily enhance coordination and 
103Fumitaka Furuoka, "International Comparison of Japan's Official Development Assistance (Oda) 
Policy," MPRA Paper, no. 11899 (2009), p. 3. 
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cooperation in international affairs and on global issues. 104 The offer of a new type of 
relation can be understood within the context of China' s foreign policy in response to 
the "Pivot to Asia" 105 policy declared by the US. 106 Although the possibility of the 
two states ' going into a form of full-fledged conflict is not high, it is likely that the 
tensions will continue to build up for the time being over the leadership in Northeast 
Asia. 
In this chapter, we have identified the geographical definition of Northeast Asia and 
its geopolitical implication to begin the analysis of Northeast Asian regionalism. In 
the process we have looked into the creation and development of ASEAN as an 
example of how regionalism began to emerge and develop in East Asia. As shown 
above, Northeast Asia has yet to develop regionalism, although its economie and 
political influence is much larger than that of Southeast Asia. There are severa! 
reasons that ex plain the lack of regionalism in Northeast Asia. First of ail , the region 
is politically fragmented although economie interdependency has become closer than 
ever. The lack of leadership in the region provides another explanation, in the 
situation where China and Japan, the two regional powers, confront against each 
other. The existence of US interests in the region is another significant factor that 
causes slow development ofregionalism in Northeast Asia. 
104Caitlin Campbell and Craig Murray, "China Seeks a "New Type of Major-Country Relationship" 
with the United States," (U.S. -China Economie and Security Review Commission, 2013). 
105 Pivot to Asia policy has been promoted by the Obama administration moving away from the 
Middle East toward Asia, with the main factor driving US interest in Asia being the growing economie 
and military power of China. (Justin Logan, "China, America, and the Pivot to Asia," Policy Analysis, 
no. 717 (January, 20 13), p.l.) 
106Heung Kyu Kim, "Research on the Changing U.S.-China Relation and Tts Impact on the U.S.-South 
Korea, U.S.-North Korea and North-South Korea Relations," (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 
Republic ofKorea, 2012). 
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CHAPTER ill 
REGIONAL IDENTITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA 
Economie interdependence cornes as a crucial element in the fonnation of regional 
cooperation in the path toward integration. There are other factors to consider in 
relation to regional integration, which encompass political, security and social aspects. 
In order to discuss regional integration in Northeast Asia, we will first take a look at 
where the three member states are in relation to their regional identity. For that 
put-pose, we will look into the historical background, particularly during the Cold 
War era, which nurtured nationalism and the slow development of cooperation in 
political realms in the region. 
3.1 Northeast Asian identity 
Northeast Asia is fragmented politically while economie integration IS m rapid 
progress as we have seen in previous chapters. To make the growing economie 
interdependence develop further to contribute to the regional integration, there must 
be a balanced cooperation in other areas than economie activities. 107 Figure 3.1 shows 
how this cooperation across inter-disciplinary areas, I.e., politics, soeiology and 
economies, are struetured for a regional integration. The top part represents the 
eombination of socio-political aspects, as empathized in the constructivist theories, 
and shows how social aspect is situated in its relation with economie and political 
aspects. 
107Ahn and Park, "A Politico-Economic Approach to Northeast Asian Regional Cooperation: Search 
for a New Mode! and Korea's Strategies", pp. 99-102. 
Figure 3.1 Interdisciplinary Consolidation of Regional Integration Theories 
Political sociology 
(Constructivism) 
Economies 
(Source) Ahn, Hyungdo and Jehoon Park, A Politico-economic Approach to Northeast 
Asian Regional Cooperation: Search for a New Madel and Korea's Strateg ies, p. 100. 
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Identity is the basis of a self and is formed in the process of defining the self in 
relation to the others. 108 The content of an individual state's identity represents how it 
defines its national interests. Constructivists focus on the process of fonnation of 
identity more than its contents or characteristics. Social identities and interests are 
always in process during interaction.109 While realists characterize national interests 
as "self-help", the notion in the context of constructivism is not given but flexible in 
the process of formation. Individual states interact among one another with open 
possibilities and co-construct new social identities and interests. To form a 
comrnunity in Northeast Asia, there has to be efforts to build a collective identity by 
way of interactions in diverse areas among concemed parties. It is necessary to 
promote social and cultural exchanges and cooperation, which can lay the ground for 
the sense of comrnunity and collective identity. The practice of utilizing the exclusive 
national sentiments for political purposes, as frequently witnessed in Northeast 
108Wendt, "Collective ldentity Formation and the International State", p. 385 . 
109Ibid. , p. 386. 
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Asia,poses a serious obstacle. The growing nationalism among the three states has its 
roots in the wide gap of perception of the historyin the region and suspicion of the 
intention of neighboring nations. The gap in understanding of historical experiences 
made its way through various competitive relations in the region and made each of 
the three states consider as a victim. 11 0 As such, the past experiences and the differing 
interpretation led to a high level of nationalism, preventing the three states from 
d . . 1 . Ill a vancmg regwna cooperatwn. 
In the case ofNortheast Asia, the role of Western powers in the region at the tum of 
the 201h century and the subsequent structure of confrontation throughout the Cold 
War era made the region different from Europe in terms of creating a community. Not 
just Northeast Asia but also the East Asian regions as a whole show the mixture of 
the traits of both pre-modem and modem eras. The legacy of the past still affects 
current political landscape. The compressed history of modem era produced 
coexistence of the past and present. In addition, it is notable that the order of modem 
era in Northeast Asia was not formed on its own but forced by extemal forces. 
Anotherdifference between the international order in Northeast Asia, as weil as the 
entire East Asian region,and that in Europe during the Cold War, is that East Asian 
states maintained bilateral, not multilateral security relationswith either one of the 
two hegemonie powers, 11 2 i.e. , the US and the Soviet Union. There was not a regional 
framework that could govem their relations multilaterally. With the end of the Cold 
War, the necessity to form a multilateral relation came into existence. However, their 
110Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia's Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of 
Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 17. 
111 Ibid. , pp. 354-359. 
112Tae Woon Kim, "Possibility ofU.S .-China Power Transition and Security Cooperation System in 
Northeast Asia," The Journal of Asian Studies 12, no. 1 (2009) , p. 34. 
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efforts in this regard remain at an initial stage, with the ASEAN Regional Forum 
being the only form of security community. 113 
Amid the state of a "Modern Sphere," Northeast Asia is now faced with a new fonn 
of network governance in the 21 st century. Economie interdependence grows across 
borders within the region. However, different polities among the three states and 
clashing national interests over hegemonie leadership between China and J apan, 
inter-Korean relations, and the US influence in the region stand in the way of regional 
integration. As such, the Northeast Asian regional identity is unlikely to emerge in 
the near future unless the legacy of the Cold War and the animosities from unresolved 
historie and territorial issues are settled in one way or another. However, a social 
memory is not something that can be "reset" 11 4 so easily, especially when animosities 
fuel nationalism as today. The bilateral relations among the three states, that is, 
China-Korea, China-Japan and Japan-Korea, seem to be relatively relaxed, but 
trusting relationship in Northeast Asia as a whole is still far away. Thus, it becomes 
important to keep the mutual and trilateral interdependence growing while making 
additional efforts to encourage exchanges in various private sectors to that effect. The 
way nationalism affects state interests should be treated as "an open, empirical issue, 
not assumed a priori to produce egoism inevitably." 115 ln other words, nationalism 
itself may not be a problem as long as it do es not entail egoism. Taking an example of 
the exclusive and chauvinistic German nationalism in 1939, which went through a 
change to harmonize with the European community today, Wendt embraced the 
possibility of the "constructive nature of nationalism." 11 6 European and Southeast 
11 3Jin Yeong Jeong, "From Periphery to Center: South Korea's Ex tema! Strategy for Northeast Asian 
Economie Hub," Korean and World Politics 20, no . 1 (2004) ,p. 190. 
114Mutsumi Hirano, Collective Identity and Regional Cooperation in Northeast Asia? , The BISA 
Conference 20 13 . 
11 5Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State", pp. 387-388. 
116Ibid., p 387. 
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Asian nations have shown a state-centric tendency but they have also respected 
sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. 117 In contrast, the three Northeast 
Asian states have held on to the state-centrism to an extent where state interest 
overpowers the interests at regional lev el. 11 8 Therefore, the issue of how to create and 
nurture common interests at regional leve! can be crucial in veering the contemporary 
nationalism toward a more constructive matmer. 
3.2 Nationalism in China, Japan and South Korea 
In East Asia, the security issue has always been on top of the priority list and the 
statesin the region are not prepared to yield their sovereignty for any other cause. The 
sentiment of nationalism lies in the core of the obstacle thatworked against the 
formation of regionalism. 11 9Nationalism in Northeast Asia developed different! y from 
one state to another, depending on the unique situation surrounding them. It has to be 
noted that the nationalism found in this region hinges in large part upon the legacy of 
the recent past. Perceptions about what happened in the past vary considerably across 
states. An empirical study conducted on university students in the three states showed 
that not only the balance of economie and military power but also "the impact of the 
beliefs about the shared past has on the perception of threat". 120 Perceptions of the 
shared past and the resulting impact on the growth of nationalism, therefore, can play 
a crucial role in the formation of the present and future foreign policy preferences. 
11 7Eun Ju Chi, "Regional Identities and Nationalism in the Shaping of Northeast Asia Communities," 
New Asia, New Asia Research Institute 15, no. 3 (2008), p. 139. 
11 8Ibid., p. 140. 
119He, "East Asian Ideas of Regionalism: A Normative Critique", p.ll 9. 
120Peter Hays Gries et al. , "Historical Beliefs and the Perception ofThreat in Northeast Asia: 
Colonialism, the Tributary System, and China -Japan -Korea Relations in the Twenty-First Century," 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 9 (2009) , p. 247, p. 263. 
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3.2.1 China 
Since the foundation of the People' s Republic of China in 1949, the leaders of the 
Chinese Communist Party hasmaintaineda tendency to utilize national sentiments in 
their pursuit ofboth political and economie goals. Chinese nationalism stimulated and 
developed by the govemment has played a significant role in the political realm in 
China. 121Nationalism in the form of poli ti cal doctrine emerged in the mid-1980s after 
the Opium War during 1840-1842. 122Chinese nationalism grew even strongerwith the 
successful economie growth since the 1990s and, together with the long tradition and 
cultural assets, supported the emergence of China in the global stage. There is the 
basic sentiment to recover the honor and dignity damaged by a series of humiliation 
in recent history. To China, the West has changed from an abject to imitate to a 
competitor in the real world while integrating into the global society. Zhao 
categorizes the evolvement of nationalism in China into three forms : ethnie, liberal 
and pragmatic liberalism. 123 The ethnie nationalism surfaced amid the general 
sentiment after the intrusion of foreign forces in China to redeem humiliations China 
suffered. At this stage, it was the Han majority that played a central role in the 
development of nationalism. At the tum of the 201h century, along with the political 
and economie tumults, a new form of nationalism, liberal nationalism, took over the 
Chinese society. The characteristic of liberal nationalism was that it was opposed to 
bath Western forces and, at the same time, the state. The growing liberal nationalism 
was a significant challenge for the Chinese Central Party (CCP) as it was faced with 
pressures from two sides, i.e. , foreign forces represented by the US and Japan in 
particular and liberal nationalists who resisted foreign pressures and called for active 
121Peter Hays Gries, China's New Nationalism : Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2004 ). 
122Suisheng Zhao, "China's Pragmatic Nationalism: ls It Manageable?," The Washington Quarter/y 29, 
no. 1 (2005), p. 132. 
1231bid., p. 133 . 
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political participation by the population in the country. The pragmatic nationalism, 
which emerged in the early 1980s, has been the current feature of China' s nationalism. 
The pragmatic nationalism shows a middle road and interest-driven tendency and 
avoids ideological doctrine. It is the current reality, therefore, that CCP tends to rein 
in rising influence from the liberal nationalists. 124 
A recent analysis over the contemporary trend of China' s nationalism addresses the 
issue from the angle of the state-society relation. 125 According to the research, the 
Chinese contemporary nationalism developed in three stages from 1980s first with 
"liberal nationalism" characterized by China' s openness and the efforts to leam from 
the West. The liberal nationalism was then followed by "patriotic nationalism" and 
"social nationalism", each characterized "defensive" and "offensive", respectively. 
The current stage belongs to the social nationalism, where the core of the society is 
made up of "Fen Qings" or "angry youths", who maintain a critical stance both 
intemationally and domestically. Mostly born after the 1980s during the period of 
China' s economie growth, these groups of youths are unhappy not just with western 
societies but also with their domestic situation. 126 They are unhappy with the 
perceived unfair treatment of China by others. They have led a series of 
demonstrations against the US, Europe and Japan in that context. The long-lasted 
humiliation and the poverty that suppressed China have been slowly overcome but 
the sentiments against those surrounding China are expressed frequently in the form 
of nationalism. 
124Ibid., pp. 142- 143. 
125Lijun Yang and Chee Kia Lim, "Three Waves ofNationalism in Contemporary China: Sources, 
Themes, Presentations and Consequences," East Asian Institute Working Paper 155 (2010), pp. 4-5. 
126Ibid., p. 17. 
51 
3.2.2 Japan 
On June 9, 1995, Domiichi Murayama, then Prime Minister of Japan announced a 
statement, expressing "deep remorse" and "apology" for the colonial rule and 
aggression. However, there were also movements to the contrary in the Di et of J a pan. 
New groups appeared in Japan around the announcement of the statement. The first 
one was the "League of Members of Parliament for the 50th Anniversary of the End 
of the War" in December 1994 led by Seisuke Okuno, leader of the Liberal 
Democratie Party. There was also the "Diet Member Group for Considering Japan' s 
Future and History" in 1997. The se two groups shared their understanding of the past, 
as they were opposed to the so-called "masochistic historical viewpoint" allegedly 
imposed by the war victors. They argued that Japan needed to take on roles that were 
more political and carry out responsibilities cmmnensurate to the economie influence 
it had. As a result, they took a strong stance in relation to such issues as revision of 
the history textbooks for school students, hardline resistance on territorial issues and 
resumption of tri butes in the Yasukuni Shrine. 127 
Extemal factors for the growing nationalism in Japan derive from its relations with 
neighboring states on several issues: the rise of China and the legacy the two states 
both share, nuclear development in North Korea, and the growing pressure from 
Japanese public calling for an equitable partnership with the US. 128 Intemally, the 
stagnating J apanese eco nom y and the new generations have formed the ground of 
contemporary nationalism in Japan. The new generations generally perceive that they 
127Yasukuni Shrine is a Japanese shrine to war deads from 1867- 1951. This eligibility includes 
civilians in service and government officiais. However, those judged as war criminals at the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) during the Second World War were later 
enshrined. The visits by Japanese Prime Ministers and government officiais to the shrine have been 
criticized by China, South Korea, and Taiwan as being revisionist and unapologetic about the events of 
the past war. 
128 Arpita Mathur, "Japan's Contemporary Nationalism: Trends and Politico-Securi ty Drivers," 
Strategie Analysis 31, no. 1 (2007), pp. 113-11 4. 
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are not responsible for what happened in the past. 129 The emergence of post-war 
generation represented the general trend in which the Japanese identity has been 
rearranged toward conservatism. 130 The shift from the post-World War II pacifist 
tradition toward more conservative and nationalistic sentiments among the young 
generations is attributable to the continued disputes over history and territorial issues 
with neighbors, growing influence from conservative media and intellectuals and 
declining voice from leftist parties. 131 Sasada brought to our attention additional 
factors that explain the shift toward nationalistic sentiments among youths since the 
1990s, such as the growing popularity of nationalist manga (Japanese comic books), 
increasing Internet use and interest in international sporting events where sports are 
used to perpetuate antagonistic notions of identity. 132 
The growing nationalistic sentiment in Japan was at its highest with the election of 
Junichiro Koizumi in 2009 as new Prime Minister of Japan. He knew weil about the 
damage to the Northeast Asian regionalism if Japan failed to manage its bilateral 
relations with China and South Korea. However, he must have judged that a strong 
Japan based on national pride among the Japanese public weighed more than its 
relations with neighboring countries did. Koizumi ' s strong stance was relayed later to 
Shinzo Abe in 2012. Abe has been successful in gathering the population around the 
so-called Abenomics. Abenomics is the name of the economie policy with an aim to 
revitalize the sluggish economy with a massive fiscal stimulus, aggressive monetary 
easing from the Bank of Japan, and structural reforms to boost Japan's 
competitiveness.It is notable, however, that economie recovery in Japan led by Abe's 
129Ibid. , p. 117. 
130Dong Sung Kim, "Regional Security Order in Northeast Asia and Nationalism," National Strategy 
15, no. 4 (2009),pp. 12-14. 
13 1Hironori Sasada, "Y ou th and Nationlism in Japan," The SAIS Review of International Affairs 26, no. 
2 (Surnmer 2006), p. 112. 
132Ibid., p. 11 2, p. 120. 
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leadership coincided with repeated conflicts over the territorial and history issues and, 
as a result, accompanied by aggravating nationalism in J a pan. It has th us been a 
routine that the Japanese political leaders tend not to be hesitant to confront or even 
trigger frictions with China and South Korea over historical issues during the times of 
rising tensions with these neighboring countries. He was able to combine national 
pride of economie recovery with nationalism. Although the contemporary nationalism 
in Japan differs from the pre-war militarism, it tends to incline toward stronger 
national defense policies and negative views of neighboring countries, accompanied 
by xenophobie sentiments especially in the youths generation. 133 
3 .2.3 South Korea 
The Korean nationalism in recent history has been formed throughout the period of 
colonialism and imperialism brought by Japan at the tum of the 20th century. Thus, 
the characteristic of its nationalism shows a tendency of anti-colonialism and anti-
imperialism.What matters is that the Korean nationalism failed to develop into a 
systematic ideology along the path, because it could not develop a society with 
middle class citizens wealthy enough to lead the social reform. 134 Devoid of the 
middle class citizens and a series of invasion from outside, Korean nationalism was 
directed toward anti-foreign forces rather than internai necessity to fight against 
feudalistic order. That is, the Korean nationalism laid emphasis more on its 
independence than the necessity of liberty within the territory. 135 However, the whole 
territory tumed into the battlefield for surrounding powers, first with the war between 
China and J apan and th en another one between Russia and J a pan. Am id the turmoil 
133Ibid., p. 111. 
134Hae Lee Hahn, "A Study on the Historical Characteristics ofKorean Nationalism: The Prospect of 
Korean Nationalism as Unification Ideology in Korean Nation" (Inha University, 200l),pp. 47-50. 
135Ibid., p. 46. 
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of wars, the Korean society failed to grasp the opportunity to form a modem nation-
state and lost its sovereignty to Japan in the early 1900s. Soon after its liberation after 
the end of the Second World War in 1945, the nation was divided into two with a 
communist regime established in North, exposed completely to the confronting logics 
between the US and the Soviet Union. The division into two Koreas prevented 
nationalism from growing into a major political influence and created an environment 
where the sentiment of nationalism was mobilized as a way to strengthen the poli ti cal 
ground of the ruling parties. Such a tendency has its base on the fact that the 
formation of nationalism could not be systemized to be incorporated into a unified 
policy but exist only as the sentiment among people. In this sense, the nationalism in 
the Korean society can be described as a national sentiment without a clear goal or 
direction, which often leads to temporaneous and unorganized manifestation of 
patriotism. 136 
To form a community in Northeast Asia, interactions in diverse areas among the three 
states come as an integral element in that effort. However, efforts were made mostly 
on economie aspects and did not spill over into political realms, as shown above. 
Such a tendency has its root in the confrontation among the states in the region during 
the Cold War and growing nationalism, which fuel animosity against one another. 
This nationalistic sentiment is even stimulated intentionally by the politicians too 
often. What matters here is that the aggravating nationalism creates a situation where 
the interests at regional level are overpowered by state interests. 
136Jong Kwon Lee, "A Study on the Development and the Future Prospect ofKorean Nationalism: In 
Relation to the Characteristic ofKorean Nationalism" (lnha University, 2006), pp. 50-57. 
CHAPTER IV 
CHINA-JAP AN-KOREA FT A 
CJK FTA was first included as part of the agenda during the summit talk among the 
three states in 2009, giving birth to the first official round of meeting in March 2013 
with two subsequent meetings following in the same year. The three states shared an 
ambitious goal of creating a single intra-regional market, addressing such issues as 
commodities, rules of origin, services, and intellectual property rights. However, the 
complexity in the region, with rivalry over powers between China and Japan and 
between the US and China, with South Korea being posed in-between, barred them 
from producing concrete results out of the meetings. The three participants to the 
negotiation were motivated by different reasons both in economie and politica1 arena. 
This chapter will review how the subject of FT A was initiated in the first place and 
show the different positions of the three states in their approaches toward the talks 
over FT A. Th en there will be a review on the out1ook of the effects that are expected 
to be brought by the tri lateral FT A on both economie and poli ti cal fronts. 
4.1 Discussions over China-Japan-Korea FTA 
The leaders of China, Japan and South Korea held five summit meetings since 2008 
until 2012. The sixth meeting scheduled in May 2013 was canceled due to the 
Japanese government's decision to nationalize the disputed islands and a series of 
subsequent protests from China. The history of summit meeting in fact dates back to 
1999, when the three leaders gathered separately at the venue of the ASEAN+3 
Summit. It was an informai breakfast meeting but later it took form of a formai 
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annual meeting and gave birth to the ministerial-level "Three Party Committee" in 
20Ü4. There were also a series of Trilateral Summit Meetings held annually from the 
year 2008. However, the trilateral summit meetings among the three states began as 
part of the ASEAN Summit, not out of their own needs. Furthermore, the fact that 
thes ix th meeting scheduled for 2013 was aborted due to the territorial conflict 
indicates that the process of cooperation among the three wasstill at the mercy of 
abrupt political developments. 
The issue of the CJK FTA was first discussed in October 2009 as part of the agenda 
of the summit talk held in Beijing. During the summit talk, the heads of the three 
states reached an agreement to work together on a trilateral FT A. They agreed to set 
up a schedule for further negotiations later in May 2012. The first official negotiation 
of FTA was made in March 2013 in Seoul, followed by the second meeting in July in 
Shanghai and the thirdonein Tokyo in November. However, being at the initial stage 
of negotiation the three states have revealeda gap in their respective position over the 
category as weil as the territorial issues, implying that there will hardly be a specifie 
outcome in the near future . 137In addition, J a pan has already entered into FT A talks 
with EU and hadthe Trans-Pacifie Partnership (TPP) negotiation underway with the 
US, which implies that the timetable for the CJK FT A was not a pressing objectfor 
J a pan to work on. Another factor that makes the prospect of the CJK FT A dim in the 
near future is the political motivation with which the three parties approach the 
subj ect. For China, the CJK FT A can serve as a useful tool against the TPP, 138 while 
Japan can slow down the expansion of China in Northeast Asia and in East Asia as a 
137China, l apan, South Korea Conclude First Round Trade Talks, (South China Moming Post, 2013); 
avai1ab1e from http :/ /www.scmp.com/news/china/article/ 120 1948/china-japan-s-korea-conclude-first-
round-trade-talks. 
138Guoyou Song and Wen Jin Yuan, "China's Free Trade Agreement Strategies," The Washington 
Quarter/y 35 , no. 4 (Fall 201 2), p.ll9. 
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whole by not allowing China to build a network where it aims to play a central role. 
The motivations of the three states are listed in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Motivation for a Trilateral FT A 
China Japan South Korea 
Enhance efficiency and stability through FT A with growing trade volume 
Synergies in expanding production network by liberalizing service and 
Common investment in addition to commodity trades 
Increase intra-regional market size 
Develop economie cooperation into other areas including security and 
diplomacy 
Guard against the Guard against the Advancement into the 
possibility ofKorea- possibility of Korea- Chinese market 
Japan FTA China FTA Make up for the 
Individual Usage as a path toward Advancement into impacts from the 
ASEAN+3 the Chinese market ECF A between 
Usage as Rivalry with China China-Taiwan (20 1 0) 
counterbalance against over East Asian Usage as a path 
TPP led by the US regional integration toward ASEAN+ 3 
Source: Korea Econom1c Research Instltute (2012) 
4.2. Different positions bystates 
4.2.1 China 
China has more poli ti cal than economie intention in its approach toward CJK FT A. 139 
The very fact represents China' s basic policy toward FT As in general, where politica1 
and diplomatie relations are considered first. For China, the bilateral FTA with Korea, 
139Moon-Hyung Lee, "Econemic and Security Significance of CJK FT A and Impacts on the Creation 
ofPeace System in Northeast Asia," in CJK FTA Seminar (Seoul, S. Korea: Institute for National 
Security Strategy, September 2011), p. 38 . 
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(China-Korea FTA) can bring more than economie benefits as it offers geopolitical 
and strategie advantage in the Korean peninsula. China's economie ties with South 
Korea can also serve to put pressure on Japan and Taiwan. China has already reaped 
success with Taiwan as it concluded theEconomic Cooperation Framework 
Agreement (ECFA) in June 2010, agreeing upon subsequent negotiations in full scale 
before June 2011. Although the ECFA is mutually beneficiai to both China and 
Taiwan, the agreement may have been accelerated in the face of the projected FTA 
among China, Japan and South Korea, given the competitive relation between South 
Korea and Taiwan over the hu ge Chinese market. One of the typical characteristics of 
China's FTA policy is that it has developing countries as counterparts with 
exceptions ofNew Zealand and Singapore. In addition, the partners are mostly Asian 
countries and these partners usually have abundant natural resources. 
After successfully joining the WTO in November 2002, China recognized FTA as an 
important tool for national trade strategy and has actively increased the number of 
counterparts sm ce th en. Beginning with the Cl oser Economie 
PartnershipArrangement (CEPA) with Hong Kong and Macau in 2003 and 2004, 
respectively, China currently has FT As with ASEAN, Pakistan, Chile, New Zealand 
and Singapore. China' s FTA policy is characterized as a graduai and flexible 
approach. At an initial stage, it tends to concentrate on commodity trades and then 
move on to service areas.140 
140Yunling Zhang, "The Impact ofFree Tracte Agreements on Business Activity: A Survey ofFirms in 
the People's Republic of China," ADBI Working Paper Series 25 1 (October 20 10), p. l. 
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Table 4.2 FT A Partners 
Under Study 
Hong Kong (EPA 2003) Southern African lndia, Switzerland 
Macau (CEPA 2004), ASEAN (2006) Customs Union (SACU), South Korea 
China Chile (2006), Pakistan (2007) lceland, GCC New Zealand (2008) Norway, Austral ia, CJK* 
Singapore (2009), Peru (2010) 
Taiwan (ECFA 2010), Costa Rica (2011) 
Singapore (2002), Mexico (2005 ), South Korea, GCC. TPP 
Malaysia (2006) Chile (2007) Australia, Mongolia, 
Thailand (2007), Indonesia (2008) Colombia, Canada 
Japan Brunei (2008), Philippines (2008) CJK, EU, RCEP 
ASEAN (2008), Switzerla nd (2009) 
Vietnam (2009), lndia (2011) 
Peru (2012) 
Chile (2004), Singapore (2006) Canada, Mexico, GCC Mercosur, Israel 
EFTA (2006), ASEAN (2007) Austra lia, New Zealand Central America, Mexico 
South India (2010), EU (2011) Jndonesia, Ch ina, 
Korea Peru (2011), U.S (2012) Vietnam 
Columbia (2012), Turkey (2012) RCEP, Japan, CJK 
Source: Ministry of Commerce (PRC ), Ministry of Trade, lndustry & Energy (S. Korea), MET! (Japan) 
*China has classified UK under the category of ·under Stud y", while Japan and South Korea considers it as under negotiation. 
China hopes to create a regional economie community where East Asian states play 
the main role. It is opposed to the idea of creating the Free Trade Agreement Asia 
Pacifie (FTAAP) led by APEC and is keen to reduce America' s influence in Asia. In 
addition, as J apan has entered into negotiation over joining TPP, China felt the 
necessity to create actively its own FTA networks,14 1 which include the China-South 
Korea and CJK FTA. It would be hardly conceivable for China to watch TPP where 
J apan participates while CJK FT A fail s. Th us, China is lik ly to co ne ntrat on both 
CJK FTA and China-ASEAN FTA as its integration into the East Asian region 
progresses. 142 
141Song and Yuan, "China's Free Trade Agreement Strategies", p. 111. 
142Sang Kuk Kim, "Prospect ofTPP and China's Position," in Current Issues of the Chinese Economy 
(Beijing: Korea Institute for International Economie Policy, 20 12), p. 8. 
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4.2.2 Japan 
J a pan has both strategie and economie intention toward CJK FT A. The long lasted 
economie recessionfor the past two decades has led Japan to boost its exports in a 
larger market. At the same time, it has been in competition with China over the 
hegemonie position in East Asia. Japan was once criticized by domestic public 
opinion that it was lagging behind the race of FTA, 143 but it has increased its trade 
network significantly since then. Japan has pursued a more comprehensive fonn of 
FTA, which includes not just trade of commodities but ways to improve the general 
business environment. Japan's FTAs are targeted at developing countries rather than 
advanced ones with large markets, and they call their FT As "Economie Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs)" because EPA covers various elements beyond tariff 
elimination. 144 Japan's FTA strategy is weil expressed in the "Basic Policy on 
Comprehensive Economie Partnerships", announced in November 2011 by the 
Japanese government. The policy document states as follows : 
( . .. ) WTO Do ha Development Agenda, their fa te remains uncertain and the 
networks of high-level EP A/FT As fonned by major trading countries are 
expanding. Despite these developments, Japan is falling behind ( . . . ) lt is 
necessary to deepen economie relationships with Asian and emerging countries 
whose markets are expected to grow, and with Western and resource-rich 
countries. 145 
Earlier than the announcement of the Basic Policy, the Japanese government had 
made an official announcement in its White Paper saying that it would pursue 
143Naoyuki Fukuda, "Japanese Businesses Fear Impact ofU.S-South Korea FIA," Asahi Shimbun, 14 
October 2011. 
144Daitsuke Hirasuka, H. Sato, and I. !sono, "A Study on the Impact offree Trade Agreements on 
Business Activity in Asia: The Case of Japan," ADBI Working Paper Series 143 (2009), p.2. 
145Basic Policy on Comprehensive Economie Partnerships, (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 
2011); available from http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fta/policy20101106.html. 
61 
bilateral trade policy added to its preference of multilateral approach under the WTO 
agreement. Such change includes both economie and political positions of Japan. On 
the economie front, it intends to diversify trade and investment counterparts. 
Traditionally, Japan had the US, Northeast Asia, ASEAN and EU as its major trade 
counterparts, with the US being at the top of the partners list. However, with NAFT A 
taking effect in 1994, the US successfully initiated a free trade area with Canada and 
Mexico, which caused a relative decrease Japan's weight on the part of the US. At the 
same time, the increasing trade volume with East Asian states triggered the needs to 
grow the regional community that could rival with NAFT A and EU. Japan 's interest 
in the East Asian region led to a more aggressive involvement in the region where 
many Japanese firms had already moved for direct investments due to rising yens 
after the Plaza Accord in 1985. 146 
On the political front, Japan found it more efficient to put more efforts on EPA and 
FT A strategy than multilateral approach as expressed in the above governrnent 
announcement. One of the factors that motivated Japan to move in that direction was 
its competitive relation with China over the leadership in East Asia. The fifth 
ASEAN-China Summit in November 2001 could be regarded as the direct cause of 
Japan's policy change. During the forum, China and ASEAN agreed to conclude FTA 
within ten years. In a swift response, J apan made a proposai of the formation of "East 
Asia Community" in Singapore in January 2002 at the ASEAN+3 meeting. In 2004, 
after the approval in the Di et of the basic po licy for the EP A in the future and J apan 
began to proceed with a series of negotiations. Later in 2006, Japan made an official 
proposai in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to extend ASEAN+3 into including three other 
nations, India, Australia and New Zealand, and form ASEAN+6. The proposai was 
met with a strong resistance from China which had insisted on limiting the number to 
13 (ASEAN+3) in building a free trade area, but was eventually accepted by the 
146Cheol-Gu Kang, "Japan's EP A Po licy and lts Implication," in lapan Research (2007). pp. 7-8. 
62 
members in November 2011 in Bali, Indonesia. The ASEAN+6 had its first official 
meeting in August 2013 in Brunei with a goal of completing negotiation on the 
Regional Comprehensive Economie Partnership (RCEP) in 2015. These movements 
by J apan indicate that its EP A po licy is rather poli ti cal than economie as it wants to 
main tain EP A as a method to check China which has been active with efforts to 
embrace East Asia. What motivated Japan to sign the agreement was its sense of 
competition with China over FT As. lt has traditionally been the US factor that affects 
Japan's policies of regionalism. However, the recent maves show that Japan's most 
powerful rival is its neighbor China. The direct cause of proposing ASEAN+6 shows 
that Japan is considering both the US and China factors in the short tenn.147 
4.2.3 South Korea 
South Korea stepped into the FTA rush after the fi nan cial cri sis in 1997. Sin ce th en it 
has beenone of the most active countries to conclude FT As with its trade partners. 
The counterparts used to be smaller economies at firstand then was extended to 
include larger ones such as the EU, the US, and lndia. Talks over bilateral FT As with 
China and Japan are already underway. TheKorea-Japan FTA dates back to 1998 
when a bilateral ministerial level agreement took place, but the South Korean 
government is concerned over the negative impacts from the bilateral FT A with J apan 
due to the similar industrial structure and Japan' s higher comparative advantages in 
the manufacturing sector. Japan also is not an easy situation to open up its 
agricultural market, where South Korea has advantages. Given the situation, South 
Korea is now more interested in the bilateral FT A with China. The prospect of 
building a trilateral FT A network does not seem easy, as the South Korean 
147Terada, "Directional Leadership in Institution-Building: Japan's Approach to ASEAN in the 
Estab lishment ofpECC and APEC", p. 8. 
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government fears massive influx of Chinese agricultural products and widening trade 
gaps with Japan, which will negatively affect the South Korean economy. 148 
4.3 Expected effects of CJK FTA on poli ti cal and economie fronts 
4.3.1 Effects on the economie front 
The wave of regionalism has swept the entire East Asian region in full swing since 
the Asian financial cri sis. A series of multilateral or bilateral agreements have created 
a complex network of economie cooperation to the extent of creating a "spaghetti 
bowl effect." If the three states in Northeast Asia successfully give birth to a trilateral 
FTA, it will form a single and the most dynamic economie zone with a population of 
a 1.5 billion people. The Northeast Asia has already positioned itself as one of the 
three pillars in the global economy together with the EU and NAFT A. The total GDP 
of the three states reachedU$14 trillionin 2011 , accounting for about 20% of the total 
global GDP. 149Corresponding volumes of the NAFT A and the EU were U$18 trillion 
and U$ 17.6 trillion, respectively. 150 Therefore, it will be worthwhile to look at the 
positive effects that the CJK FT A may bring to North east A si a in the near future. 
Ali of the three states have an export-oriented economie structure and extemal trade 
plays a crucial role in their economie development. Ali of them have participated in 
the WTO multilateral trade system. The weight of intra-regional trade wasrecorded at 
148Byung Il Choi and Kyung Hee Lee, "Korea's FIA Strategy from the Perspective of the Formation of 
RCEP " in KER! Po licy Research , ed. Byung Il Choi (Seoul : Korea Economie Research Institute, 
2012),p. 17. 
149The Ministry of Foreign Affairs ofKorea (2011) 
150Ibid. 
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USD 674.3 billion or 21.3% in 2011, 151 showing a graduai increase since 1995. China 
became the largest destination of exports for South Korea in 2003 and the largest 
market from which South Korea imports in 2004. For Japan, China is the second 
largest market for exports and the largest importer of Japanese products. Korea is the 
fourth largest exporters to the Chinese market and the third importer from 
China. 152Such relations signify that they have already graduated their previous pattern 
of unilateral reliance on the US market. The rising trade volume shows that the 
complementary roles among the three economies are well established. The capital and 
technology of Japan, management knowhow and capital power of South Korea, and 
China's labor force, ample natural resources and its dynamic and enonnous domestic 
market can be combined together for the benefit of them ali. 
The economie growth of China was a substantial variant to the growing trade volume 
between Japan and South Korea. South Korea ' s trade volume with China has grown 
leaps and bounds since the diplomatie relation was made in 1992, except during the 
period of Asian financial crisis in 1998 . The trade pattemsin Northeast Asia show the 
operation of a production network, a structure where the supply chain connectivity is 
built upon a vertical integration. Japan and South Korea produce capital-intensive 
parts and semi-finished products for exports to China and the ASEAN region. These 
products are then assembled and the final products are exported to outer-regional 
areas including the US and the EU. (Figure 4.1) 
151 Choi and Lee, "Korea's FTA Strategy from the Perspective of the Formation of RCEP ", p. 14. 
152 Economy and Trade Statistics of Korea, (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea, 20 12); avai1able 
from http ://www.mofa.go.kr/trade/data/statisticslindex.jsp?menu=m _ 30 _ 210 _90. 
Figure 4.1 Production Network in East Asia 
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The existing trilateral trade structure is based on the vertical forrn of specialized 
production, which characterizes the trade pattemin the region. Both Japan and South 
Korea' s exports to China show a high ratio of parts and semi-finished products in 
electronics and machinery industries. Narrowing the scope to the bilateral relation 
between Japan and South Korea, however, increasing exportsfrom South Korea 
entailcommensurate increase of imports from J a pan. The correlation between Korea' s 
exports to other countries and imports from Japan that stood at 0.952 during the 
period of 1990 and 2007,153signifying that Korea' s export depends largely on imports 
of parts and materials that require high-level technology from Japan. 
153Eun Kyung Jeon, "Comparative Analysis on the Trade Structure and Industrial Policies of Korea-
China-Japan: With a Focus on Parts and Materials Industries," NARS Report on Current Issues 115 
(2011 ), p. 8. 
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Figure 4.2 shows that ail of the three states need one another as crucial trade partners. 
The current vertically specialized trade structure will contribute only to perpetuate 
their trade relations as long as it continues. 
Figure 4.2 Parts and Materials Trades among China, Japan and South Korea 
JAPAN 
US$20 billion US$53 billion 
v 
SOUTH KOREA 
US$57.4 
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Source: Korea International Trade Association 2010 
4.3.2 Effects on the political front 
Geographically adjacent, China, Japan and South Korea have maintained tense 
relations both politically and militarily particularly since the turn of the 201h century. 
(Figure 4.3)Current conflicts among them, either bilateral or common for ail of them, 
have been the underlying cause of the slow development of regionalism in East Asia. 
The prospect of a peaceful resolution of the ongoing issues is not optimistic at least 
for the moment, because it happens too often that a single dispute over the territorial 
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or historie issue results in the stoppage of efforts to promote exchanges in the private 
and commercial sectors. Animosities against one another are often mobilized 
intentionally by govemments and press, usually leading to a delay or cancellation of 
ongoing efforts to promote friendly relations. 
Figure 4.3 Conflict Factors in Northeast Asia 
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Political conflicts and resulting animosities in the region are sure to negatively affect 
the development of CJK FT A talks. At the same time, however, we can think 
reversely by focusing on the impacts of the ongoing talks over CJK FT A on the 
poli ti cal relations of the three states. In other words, the booming FT As in East Asia, 
particularly the one among China, Japan and South Korea, cannot be discussed out of 
a political context. As delineated in Chapter II, both China and Japan have extended 
their respective FT A networks in East Asia as part of their rivalry over leadership in 
the region. On the part of South Korea also, economie interdependency is not the sole 
factor that drives the efforts for expanding FT A networks, as its po licy has to weigh 
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"balance"154 in the political context of China-US rivalry in East Asia. As bilateral or 
trilateral FT As among China, J apan and South Korea inevitably entail poli ti cal 
consideration, it becomes necessary that CJK FTA has to be understood from the 
perspective of cooperation in political and security areas, 155 and how it will change 
the political landscape in the region. 
Loo king at the relation between China and J a pan, the two regional powers have 
maintained official diplomatie relations since the normalization of diplomacy in 1972. 
Despite the growing exchanges and developments in economie and cultural sectors, 
their political relations have gone through difficulties leading them to conflicts and 
distrust. The bilateral relation involves territorial disputes over the "Diaoyu Dao" 
("Senkaku Islands" as called in J apan) and their differing perceptions of the history 
among others. China's concems over Japan' s efforts to contain China through the 
US-Japan military alliance have ceaselessly triggered conflicts between China and 
Japan, both ofwhich rival over the hegemonie power in East Asia. 
As for the bilateral relation between South Korea and Japan, the history of 
colonization of Korea by the Japanese military is still an unresolved issue. The two 
sides normalized their diplomatie relations in 1965 with an active support of the US 
and put an end to the existing hostilities against each other. Throughout the Cold War 
era, both J a pan and South Korea served as the bridgehead of the "free world"in 
Northeast Asia under the leadership of the US against communism in mainland China 
and the Soviet Union. The period of confrontation with communist China and the 
Soviet Union made both Japan and South Korea work together leaving the 
154Jae-Kyung Park, "China-U.S. Relations in East Asia: Strategie Rivalry and Korea's Choice," in A 
Report of the CSIS Korea Chair (Washington, DC, U.S.: Center for Strategie and International Studies, 
April 2013) , pp. 10-14. 
155Kim, "Significance of China-Japan-Korea FT A in the Economie and Security Sectors and Its Impact 
on Building a Peace Structure in Northeast Asia", p. 54. 
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antagonistic relations behind. The cooperative relation lasted, however, only to the 
end of the Cold War period. As the imminent threats from the communist bloc 
dwindled, the past began to haunt their relation again and weakened the bilateral 
relation during the mid-1990s. However, their economie and political relations have 
already been closely interlocked in the face of burgeoning economie regionalism and 
growing competition across East Asia. These changes made South Korea and Japan 
strengthen their fonnerly automatic but lukewarm cooperation in political and 
military areas, and form a relation that was more bilateral and more regional than 
before. 
China and South Korea maintained an antagonistic relation without a diplomatie tie 
after the foundation of the People' s Republic of China in 1949. China pursued in full 
swing a modemization policy in the late 1970s under the leadership of Deng 
Xiaoping. Later in 1992, the two states formed a diplomatie relation. While South 
Korea gave up its diplomatie tie with Taiwan for the One China polie y of the Chinese 
govemment, China held on toits Two Koreas policy, admitting both North and South 
Korea in the political context. In other words, the Chinese govemment has been keen 
not to harm its traditional relationship with North Korea while developing a new 
relation with the South. China' s policy toward the Korean peninsula has been to 
enhance regional stability and strengthen its influence in the region in three different 
aspects: managing its relations with North Korea, the approaches to South Korea, and 
encouraging a North-South dialogue. 156 The Two Koreas policy, or the separate 
approach toward politics and economy, began to sag after the North Korean nuclear 
issue began. Traditional advocate for North Korea, China began to show signs of 
changing po !ici es toward the North during the times of disputes over the nuclear issue. 
China limited its oil export to the North at the second nuclear crisis in 2003 , and 
156Jia Hao and Zhuang Qubing, "China's Policy toward the Korean Peninsula," Asian Survey XXXII, 
no. 12 (1992), p. 1142. 
70 
during the two subsequent occasions of nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009. 157 China even 
reduced its oil supply to a substantial leve! for a while after the third nuclear test in 
February 13, 2013 in North Korea. China has generally opposed sanctions against 
North Korea, but with the disputes over the third test, it relented and backed U.N. 
sanctions 158 showing signs of changes in its alliance with North Korea. 
As shown above, there still exist a number of unresolved volatile issues that prevent 
the three states from making closer cooperation. These issues will inevitably be 
addressed in one way or another in the course of discussions over CJK FT A 
considering the necessity of a stability in political relations for a continued economie 
cooperation. In fact, there have been signs of positive effects emerging from 
economie cooperation which initiated discussions over political issues. (Table 4.3) 
The series of agenda of the annual Trilateral Summit Meetings were mostly about 
economie issues in the beginning but began to slowly extended to include more 
political ones as the meetings continued. Therefore, the commencement of 
negotiation over the CJK FT A can be seen as a facilitating factor in fa v or of 
development into improved relations among countries. 
Although the discussion over FTA among the three states was initiated earlier in 2009, 
the formai negotiation took place four years la ter in 2013 followed by two other 
rounds of meeting in the same year. At the initial stage of negotiation, the three 
participants to the negotiation already revealed gaps in their positions toward the 
trilateral agreement. For China the agreement would be a tool to guard it against the 
possibility of Korea-J a pan FT A and could be used as counterbalance against TPP led 
157Kwang Soo Kim, "China Put Pressure on Oil Supply after the Third Nuclear Test in North Korea 
(Translated)," Hankook llbo, 20 April, 20 13. 
158Shaun Waterman, "China Stops Oil Exports to North Korea, Possibly as Punishment for Nuclear 
Test," Washington Times, 22 March, 2013 . 
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by the US . Japan also wants to use the agreement as a counterbalance against China' s 
effort to increase its influence in East Asia, while it aims to increase its market in the 
region. On the part of South Korea, in its competition with Taiwan over the Chinese 
market, it hopes to use the agreement as a conduit toward ASEAN+ 3 and, also, 
alleviate the impacts from the ECF A between China and Taiwan. With all the 
different hopes and expectations, CJK FTA is likely to strengthen, if not perpetuate, 
the already formed production network in East Asia, a vertical structure where Japan 
and South Korea produce capital-intensive products for exports to China and other 
ASEAN countries. On the political front, the prospect is not so bright due to a 
number of conflict factors that exist in Northeast Asia. Such political conflicts and 
resulting animosities in the region will negatively affect the advancement of talks 
over the trilateral agreement. However, as the annual Trilateral Summit Meetings 
have already showed, the meeting agenda of the trilateral meeting have gradually 
evolved to include sensitive issues, showing signs of positive outlook in search of 
efforts to relent the tensions. 
Date/Place 
1st Meeting 
Dec. 13, 2008 
Fukuoka, 
Japan 
2"ct Meeting 
Oct. 10, 2009 
Beijing, China 
3rd Meeting 
May 29,20 10 
Jeju, S. Korea 
4th Meeting 
May2 1, 20 11 
Tokyo, Japan 
5th Meeting 
May 12, 20 12 
Beijing, China 
Table 4.3 Trilateral Summit Meeting Agenda (2008-2012) 
Agenda 
Trilateral cooperation and future 
development 
Policies on the international financial 
and economie issues 
Regional and international issues 
Northeast Asian political 
environment 
Climate Change, etc. 
Trilateral cooperation and fu ture 
development 
Regional and international issues 
North Korean nuclear issue 
Trilatera1 cooperation and fu ture 
development 
Regional and international issues 
G20, climate change, Nuclear 
Security Summit, non-proliferation, 
Co-policies ill times of fi nancia l 
Cf! SIS 
Trilateral cooperation and fu ture 
development 
Regional and international issues 
North Korean nuclear issue 
Cooperation between China and 
Japan at the Nuclear Security 
Summit in 20 12 
Trilateral cooperation and future 
development 
Regional and international issues 
North Korean nuclear issue 
Sustained development 
Increase social, human and cultural 
ex change 
Major Achievements 
Trilateral 
annualized 
Summit Meeting 
Agreements on trilateral cooperation 
Joint Statement on the Tenth 
Anniversary ofTrilateral Cooperation 
Joint Statement on Sustainable 
Development 
Agreement on joint study over 
trilateral FT A 
Memorandum of Understanding over 
Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat 
(TCS) 
Trilateral Cooperation VISION 2020 
Summit Declaration 
Agreements on cooperation on 
nuclear safety, disaster, sustainable 
growth through recyclable energy 
efficiency 
Commencement ofTCS 
· Investment Protection Agreement 
Agreement on commencement of 
CJK FTA in 20 12 
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(note) The 61" meetmg was scheduled ill Apnl 2013 but was postponed due to the detenoratillg 
relations triggered again by the disputes over terri tories and history issues. 
CHAPTER V 
ROLE OF CJK FTA IN NORTHEAST ASIAN REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
Northeast Asia is a region where poli ti cal disputes and competition of military build-
up continue. Efforts for self-help are important especially amid the concems over 
North Korea' s nuclear arms, which make the already conflicting relations more 
complex among the related parties, including the US. Economie co-prosperity and 
continued development, on the other hand, have played the role of binding them 
together. In a close-knit structure of production network, the states in the region have 
needed one another to continue their own growth in the globalizing economy. 
However, such economie cooperation has often been subject to abrupt tums caused 
by political issues and there is not an official, institutional framework in place to keep 
their individual interests in line with the common goal of co-prosperity. Lack of such 
framework poses a problem as the three states are devoid of the channels for 
communication in which their respective interests can be coordinated to form 
common interests. This chapter will address the role of CJK FT A in its contribution 
to the regional integration, from the perspective of a fonnation of an institutional 
framework in the region, alleviation of conflict structure and, finally, formation of 
regional identity and common interests. 
5.1 Establishment of an institutional framework for communication 
The growing volume of intra-regional economie activities in Northeast Asia have 
contributed significantly in the region in terms ofbinding the three states together for 
a common goal of economie prosperity. However, it is also true that they lack in the 
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sense of community that can make their co-efforts jump to a higher level to cooperate 
in political and security areas. The facilitating factor for regional integration has no 
doubt been initiated by economie benefits but it is also required that psychological 
elements in socio-cultural area have to follow. 159 In fact, there have been efforts to 
institutionalize cooperative relations in these areas at the private level since the tum 
of21 51 century. (Table 5.1) 
Table 5.1 Cooperation at the Private and Provincial Level 
Area Organization Agenda/ Acti vi ty 
Business CJK Business Summit Coordinated response against 
(since 2009) financial crisis 
Cooperation over CJK FT A 
Cooperation over high-tech sectors 
(energy, environment, etc.) 
Society Group of Thirty Private po licy forum to discuss 
(since 2006) desirable direction of North east 
Asia' s future development 
participated by celebrities in such 
areas as joumalism and politics 
Culture Cultural Exchange Exchange of cultural activities 
Forum among the three states 
(since 2009) 
Sports Sports Exchange 
(sin ce 1993) 
A3 Champions ' Cup 
(2001~2008) 
Local Provincial Govemments Cooperation at the level of local 
Authorities Exchange Conference authorities including individual 
(since 1999) cities, provincial govemments 
159 Ahn and Park, "A Politico-Econornic Approach to Northeast Asian Regional Cooperation: Search 
for a New Mode! and Korea's Strategies", pp. 99-1 02. 
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Since the ASEAN+3 summit meeting in 1999, there have been a number of tangible 
outcomes as a result of cooperation. At a higher politicallevel, the three states created 
a formai institutional form of cooperation under the name of the Trilateral Summit 
Meeting in 2008. Together with the Trilateral Summit Meetings, there were eighteen 
ministeriallevel conferences, over fifty cooperation channels at the government leve1, 
and over one hundred on-going cooperation projects. Also, a new organization came 
into being in September 2011 to go vern co mm on issues among them opera ting un der 
the title of Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS). The birth of the TCS was the 
result of the third tri lateral summit meeting in May 2010 held in J eju, South Korea, to 
seek a more systematic approach toward cooperation. (Table 5.2) The TCS began its 
operation with its office located in Seoul and funded by the pool of subsidy from each 
of the three governments. 
The goal of the TCS is to materialize the vision of a co-prosperity and peace in 
Northeast Asia. What matters is that, despite the lofty goal of the TCS and its 
contribution to the trilateral relations, the organization functions just as the channel 
for communication with limited responsibilities. It has yet to addressthe criticalor 
conflicting issues that have bothered the member states to date, revealing its 
limitation on the raies it carries out. 
76 
Table 5.2 Responsibilities of the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat 
Sections Responsibilities 
Summit Meeting 
Political Affairs Foreign Minister's Meeting Regional and International Issues 
Security 1 Disaster Management 
Environmental Protection 
Trade and Investment 
Transport and Logistics 
Customs 
Public Relations 
Finance 
Economie Affairs Science and Technology 1 Energy 
Standards Cooperation 
Consumers 
Sustainable Development 
(Circular Economy, Health and Welfare, Agriculture 
and W a ter Re source) 
Culture 1 Tourism 
Society and Culture Affairs Education 1 Y ou th Ex changes 1 Sports Personnel Administration 
Exchange among Research Institutes 
Media 1 Press and Public Relations 
Administration & Administrative Support 
Management Budget and Accounting 1 Human Resources 
Premises and Facilities 
*Source: http ://www.tcs-asia.org 
The lack of psychological sense of community has made the economie relations 
among the three states susceptible to the influence of constant disputes over social 
and political issues. The stoppage of currency swap between South Korea and Japan 
was the case in point, implying that economie cooperation in Northeast Asia is not 
solid enough to make progress on its own. The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), which 
be gan in the wake of the Asian financial cri sis in 1997, led to an agreement between 
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South Korea and J a pan on a USD 70 billion swap in case of emergency in 2011. 160 
However, the traditional territorial disputes between the two countries hampered the 
swap agreement, which had started in a cooperative atmosphere. The Japanese 
government decided to redu ce the swap volume to USD 13 billion in April 2010 and, 
la ter in July 2013, it lowered the li mit further to USD 10 billion. Considering the size 
of 10 billion dollars was obligatory und er the CMI, a voluntary swap volume between 
South Korea and Japan equaled to zero. On the contrary, South Korea and China 
agreed to ex tend the limit of their bilateral swap and the durationat the surnmit talk in 
June 2013. The already existing 360 billion yuan (approximately USD 60 billion) 
with two year duration was extended to another five years and the limit was set 
flexible to go up when necessary. China currently maintains 400 billion yuan swap 
agreement with Hong Kong. If the South Korea-China swap volume increases, South 
Korea will be the largest partner for China in swap agreement. 
Episodes that slow down the pace of economie cooperation as a result of political 
impacts include the export ban on the rare earth material imposed by the Chinese 
government. The territorial disputes between China and J a pan in 2010 over the 
DiaoyuDao ("Senkaku Islands") resulted in an intentional slowdown of the export 
procedure for rare earth materials, critical elements for electronic industries, with 
J a pan being the primary target. The decision by the Chinese government on reducing 
the export quota was taken to the WTO later, but drove a critical impact on electronic 
industries of major exporters, among which Japan was the hardest hit. Although the 
case was later taken to the WTO, the episode left another cause of distrusts between 
the two sides. 
160 The size of swap between South Korea and Japan reached USD 70 billion in 20 11 , with additional 
won-yen currency swap agreement equivalent to USD 30 billion between central banks and another 
USD 30 billion between the Korean central bank and the Ministry ofF inance of J a pan in 20 11 . 
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Another example reflecting political influence over economie arena in Northeast Asia 
can be found in the inter-Korean relation. 161 The recent development with regard to 
the Gaesong Manufacturing Complex, a joint production area between the two 
Koreas, is a case in point. The Gaesong Manufacturing Complex gathered the 
attention from many because it signified not just a symbolic gesture of cooperation 
but opened a possibility of a détente in the peninsula. It meant more than a 
manufacturing site because the joint efforts to boost economy were expected to 
develop to reduce military tensions and deter the risk of a war. The value of the 
Complex was priceless for not just South Korea but other neighboring states such as 
China, Japan, the US and Russia, especially at a time of critical issues of North 
Korea's nuclear development. The problem was that operating the Complex was 
complete! y at the mercy of the poli ti cal influence, meaning that it could stop running 
at any moment. The Complex was virtually closed in May 2013 , as part of the 
protests from North Korea against the extemal pressure to stop nuclear developments. 
The closure of the Complex dealt with a severe blow to both, with harsher hit on the 
North Korean economy than the South. As of 2010, the trade volume of the Complex 
accounted for 75.5% of the total volume that is combined of both commercial and 
non-commercial trade sectors. 162 Economie logic could not lead the logic of politics 
as shown by this case. Although the closure of the Complex was ended in six months, 
the precedence left suspicion over future developments. What matters here is that 
reduced support from the South deepened North Korea ' s dependence on China, 
161 One of the deterring fac tors against cooperation in Northeast Asia is the existence of North Korea. 
As long as China, Japan and South Korea have different security interests in relation to North Korea, 
any talks over political or security issues among the three have to be significantly limited. China is 
practically the sole trade partner dealing with 88.3% of North Korea's total external trades wh ile Japan 
does not have a diplomatie tie with North Korea. South Korea has economie relations with North 
Korea by opera ting a joint complex, which is limited to a designated area. In this situation, North 
Korea's inconsistent fo reign policies often prevent the ne ighboring countries from worki ng together 
with foreseeable policies. 
162Trades between the two Koreas are broken down to two categories: commercial and non-
commercial. Among them, the volume generated by the Gaesong Complex was recorded at USD 1.4 
billion or 75.5% as of the end of 2011 (Ministry ofUnification ofKorea) . 
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which is highly likely to solidify the confrontational structure in Northeast Asia, as 
represented by the China-North Korea and the US-Japan-South Korea alliances. 
Therefore, with the existence of strong political logic goveming the peninsula, the 
stability of the CJK FTA may be at the mercy of abrupt changes in one way or 
another, depending on the political environment. The Chinese govemment has shown 
a sign that it is detaching itself from its relations with North Korea, however, their 
bilateral relations can retrigger the tensions with South Korea, Japan and the US any 
time. A hopeful sign emerged with the resumption of the Gaesong Complex in 
September 2013 as both the South and North Korean govemments agreed to set aside 
the operation of the industrial complex from political vicissitudes. It has yet to be 
seen if the agreement will continue to be respected, but it offers us a symbolic and 
meaningful development of the relation between the two in an environment where 
economie issue continues to gain weight. The same can be expected in implementing 
the trilateral agreement among China, Japan and South Korea by having it detached 
from political impacts as muchas possible. 
5.2 Alleviation of conflict structure 
5.2. 1 Control over excessive nationalism 
Taking a look at the process of policy making, the norms, institutions and cultural 
features of domestic and international environment affect the identities of policy 
makers, and these identities shape their interests, which affect policies, and then again 
the environment structure. 163 The process of establishing state identities is made 
through internai identification and extemal differentiation. To maintain and 
163Peter J. Katzenstein and Social Science Research Council (U.S.). Cornrnittee on International Peace 
& Security. , The Culture of National Security: Norms and Jdentity in World Politics, New Directions 
in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). 
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strengthen state identities, governments sometimes reproduce extemal threats 
intentionally. Likewise, to counter extemal threats it becomes necessary to forrn state 
identitiesin the process of identification. The emergence of nationalism in the three 
countries surely cast a cloud over the past efforts to build trust in the region. The 
nationalism in Northeast Asia as we witness today has its rootin the relatively recent 
historie experiences. China holds enmity against its defeat during the first Sino-
Japanese War (1894-1895) and hardship under Japanese imperialism thereafter. 
Korea went through the period of colonialism that left deep psychological scars. 
China and South Korea in their bilateral relation have maritime disputes over the 
Ieodo ("Suyanjiao" as named in China) and huge gaps in understanding of their 
. h" . 164 respective 1stones. 
Taking the example of Gerrnany and France, they have been through a number of 
wars for the past 150 years including the Franco-German War (1 870-71) and the two 
World Wars thereafter. Understanding the bilateral cooperation between the two 
states in building the European Union could be a meaningful tool to apply to the 
Northeast Asian region, where sufficient talks and understanding over the history 
have yet to come. In Europe, the combination of Germany's economie power and 
France ' s political strengths could form the central pillar for the foundation of the 
European Union. Both of them created an order where other countries including the 
UK could join.165 The practice of encouraging nationalism for political purposes will 
continue unless there are shared goals to understand one another. If China and J a pan, 
the two regional powers, can rely less on nationalism and build trusts between them, 
there will follow a series of multi-level cooperative programs in the region including 
South Korea. The Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) that began operation in 
164 China has claimed that part of historie heritage of Gogwy eo, an ancient Korean kingdom 
locatedacross presentday Northeast China andNorth Korea, belonged to ancient China. 
165Hyung Keun Han, "A Study on Regional Integration in East Asia: A Review through Rational 
Choice Conditions" The 2lst Centwy Political Science Association 11, no. 1 (2001) , pp. 229-230. 
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2011 was the first step toward that direction. CJK FTA, which is the ultimate goal of 
TCS, can be another step forward to induce cooperation on the economie sector 
together with a positive role to alleviate nationalism. 
5.2.2 Strengthening regional security cooperation 
The significance of CJK FTA is that it is not simply an economie issue but can affect 
the peaceful development in Northeast Asia, together with a positive influence on the 
troubled area, i.e., the Korean peninsula. 166 If CJK FT A firms its ground as a linchpin 
among the three member states, it will create a single market based on trilateral 
cooperation that can effectively control the situation involving inter-Korean 
relations. 167 However, Northeast Asia has held on to the state-centrism to an extent 
where state interest overpowers the interests at regional level. 168 The states in the 
region are not ready to yield their sovereignty to a common goal. The reason is that 
these countries went through wars and the experience of colonization without having 
the opportunities to put in place international norms and institutional frames to rule 
their extemal relations. China in the 21 51 century has been in pursuit of diplomatie and 
military power based on its outstanding economie growth. J apan has also sought to 
grow its power to a level commensurate to its economie strength in the world. These 
two major powers have stepped into a rivalry over leadership in Northeast Asia that 
resulted in the instability in the region. orth Korea' s nuclear issue poses another 
threat against the stability of regional cooperation. Although the six-party talks 
166Jung Bong Kim, "Northeast Asian Economie Community and Its Political Impact on North Korea 
and the Neighboring Countries," in The 9th Experts Policy Forum (Seoul: The Northeast Asian 
Community Studies Institute, 2011), p. 20. 
167Ibid., p. 26. 
168Chi, "Regional Identities and Nationalism in the Shaping ofNortheast Asia Conununities", p. 139. 
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dealing with the North Korean issue have been in place, the gap of understanding 
based on diverse national interests is still wide among the six states.169 
In Northeast Asia, there is not a sufficient institutional mechanism and procedure to 
systemize peaceful efforts. One can find the traits of pre-modem era of the 191h 
century together with the confrontation during the Cold War period and the post-
modem and multi-dimensional order of the 21 51 century. Therefore, it will not be easy 
to form a single regional cooperative entity in the near future . It will be a long-term 
prospect to approach this issue. The trilateral FT A mayincrease the opportunities for 
the social actors within the region to engage in business and encourage human and 
cultural exchanges. More importantly, the newly created cooperative environrnent 
may work to reduce tensions over the inter-Korean relation with commensurate 
alleviation of tensions between China and J a pan. In th at regard, CJK FT A can off er a 
stable environment for the three states to cooperate by perfom1ing a role which is 
wider than multiple bilateral economie agreements among them. 
5.2.3 Preventive role against polarization of East Asia 
The power dynamics among ASEAN, China, Japan and the US have created the 
complex network of FT A in East Asia. The on-going discussions over CJK FT A will 
add another variable into the already complicated development of economie 
integration within the region. Specifically, it will affect negotiations on other issues 
than economy and the balance between integration and polarization 170 in Asia. 
169The six-party talks began in August 2003 to work out the North Korean nuclear development issue 
among the six states composed of the two Koreas, China, Japan, the US and Russia. There were five 
subsequent talks held since then, with the last meeting held in September 2007. 
170Gilbert Rozman, "CJK Economie Trilateralism: The Prospects and Perils of a New FT A," Joint US-
Ka rea Academie Studies 24 (2013), p. 130. 
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Western Europe could form a sense of community to create an economie community 
to prevent wars after the two World Wars. At the time of creation of a community, 
the regional member states in Europe showed little incarne gap and shared the value 
of Christianity, which was a crucial factor for regional identity. The US also provided 
strong supports for the European integration in the face of possible threats from the 
Soviet Union. Situation differs greatly in East Asia, with wide gaps in mcome, 
different polities, cultures and the tense relations among the major powers. 
The increased number of participants and vanous bilateral and multilateral 
agreements have made it even harder to make the regional identity of East Asia. The 
sixth ASEAN+3 meeting in November 2002gave birth to the East Asia Summit 
(EAS), of which the first meeting took place in 2005. Shortly after its foundation, 
three other nations, India, Australia and New Zealand, joined the group with active 
supports of Japan out of concern of China' s influence. In 2011 , Russia and the US 
joined the group, tuming the EAS into a meeting where not just Oceanic but Eurasian 
and North American nations participate. 
Figure 5.1 FT A N etwork in East Asia 
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After the U.S. Congress passed a bill on a free trade agreement with South Korea in 
2011 , J a pan hurried itself to the formation of the TPP .171 Development of TPP is an 
issue that poses a serious challenge against China, considering its efforts to defend its 
interests in East Asia in relation to Japan and the US .Advancement of negotiations 
over TPP and CJK FTA made ASEAN accelerate the pace of negotiation on 
RCEP. 172 The tumout of events in a chain reaction is the product of the 
aforementioned tangled and tense relations among the US, China and Japan. Along 
with the diverse discussion on collaboration, the identity of East Asia has 
beenwatered down and the influence of ASEAN+3sagged. Nevertheless, as long as 
ASEAN' s effort to concentrate cooperative relation within East Asia, supported by 
China, the process of integration is likely to follow the two general directions: RCEP 
and TPP .173 Considering the ab solute economie dominance of China, J a pan and South 
171 Fukuda, "Japanese Businesses Fear Impact ofU.S-South Korea FTA." 
172
"Information on RCEP," (Ministry of foreign Affairs ofKorea, November 19, 2011). 
173Choi and Lee, "Korea's FTA Strategy from the Perspective of the Formation ofRCEP ", p. 10. 
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Korea in East Asia, and the existing confrontation between China and Japan with 
respect to TPP, the three Northeast Asian states are sure to play a central role in the 
process of either integration or polarization of East Asia. As long as China continues 
its growth, the intra-regional trades will keep growing in the region and further 
strengthen the trilateral relations as weil. However, with the influence of the US in 
the region, the structure of regional cooperation will not be limited to East Asia but 
will include more comprehensive geographie region. Therefore, the important 
variable in the process of economie integration in East Asia is whether the Northeast 
Asian states will maintain balanced relations with the US and cooperate one another. 
Any further aggravation of the bilateral relations between the US and China, and also 
between China and Japan, will drive negative impacts against the efforts for 
economie integration. The CJK FTA is thus a product of complex diplomatie efforts 
whereby the political and economie interests of these individual states can be 
harmonized. Although the CJK FT A cannat resolve current disputes immediate! y, the 
efforts to institutionalize economie cooperation and adjust interests among the related 
parties can produce positive effects to coordinate their interests and common policies. 
5.3 Formation of identity and interests 
For constructivists, the preference of actors is not only given exogenously but also 
created endogenously. State actors leam new norms and values through continuous 
socialization.174They then constitute new identity and interests and change their own 
preferences accordingly. It is thus ideal ones such as ideas, norms or identity that are 
important in the process of regional integration. Intra-regional trades in Northeast 
Asia increased continuously to reach 21% of their total trades as of 2011. Growing 
economie interdependency alone, however, does not necessarily lead to 
174Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics", pp. 394-
395. 
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regionalism. 175To make the growing economie interdependence develop further to 
contribute to the regional integration, there must be a balanced development on the 
part of social and poli ti cal areas as well as economie cooperation. 176 Creation of an 
institutional framework to develop more systematic cooperation becomes important 
in that regard. The lack of a framework to institutionalize cooperation signifies that 
the Northeast Asian states have yet to come up with comrnon values to share as a 
regional community. 
Each of the three states have their own interests in their pursuit of cooperation with 
one another. 177 For example, China hopes to construct political trust relationship in 
East Asia under its leadership and a more stable relationship with the US. Likewise, 
Japan hopes to maintain a more open form of cooperative relations that are not 
limited to East Asia. South Korea hopes to increase economie benefits while 
maintaining a balance among major powers including China, Japan and the US . The 
problem is that the three states have yet to bring these individual interests to a 
regional level, due to the state-centrism that prevent them from fonning a regional 
consensus. 178 In addition, the disputes over territories and past history are the 
negative factors that hinder cooperation among them. Such disputes are sometimes 
mobilized and expressed in the form of nationalism. Therefore, it may not be feasible 
in the near future for them to create a comrnon value at regional level. It should be 
noted, however, that all of the three states share the value of economie development 
in a stable environment. China's changed policy toward North Korea's nuclear 
development shows that it will not sacrifice regional security for its alliance with 
175Hosohiro, "Regionalization and Regionalism in East Asia", p. 13. 
176Ahn and Park, "A Politico-Economic Approach to Northeast Asian Regional Cooperation: Search 
for a New Mode! and Korea's Strategies", pp. 99-102. 
177Yong Sun Ha, Ryosei Kokubun, and Xing Qu, "Toward a New Era ofPeace and Comrnon 
Prosperity in Northeast Asia" (Seoul, S. Korea, December 2011), pp. 2- 10. 
178Chi, "Regional Identities and Nationali sm in the Shaping ofNortheast Asia Communities", p. 140. 
87 
North Korea. The same goes for Japan and South Korea, both of which are intent to 
maintain economie growth. The three states have already fonned a production 
network whereby Japan and South Korea produce capital-intensive parts and semi-
finished products for exports to China and the ASEAN region. (Figure 4-2) The CJK 
FTA can be regarded as an effort to institutionalize the ongoing economie 
interdependence among them. With the high dependence on trade and competitive 
manufacturing capabilities, the trilateral FT A will provide more opportunities for 
them to work together while fostering competition in Northeast Asia. 
Equally important as economie interdependence, a balanced cooperation at the level 
of political and social area has to follow. Despite the disputes over territories and 
history, the three states have maintained continuous exchanges in the private sector. 
(Table 5.1) Thefoundation of the Tri lateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) pro vides a 
positive development toward creating an institutional framework whereby the three 
states can work more officially over their common issues. Although they have just 
commenced to institutionalize their efforts for cooperation, it is likely to take a while 
before they develop their cooperation beyond the "regional grouping" backed by each 
state' s political willingness. 179It is because most East Asian states are not ready to 
accept the idea of regional cooperation that could limit their sovereignty.180 As CJK 
FTA represents not just economie issues but political positions of each member states, 
further interactions within the trilateral cooperative framework are likely to affect the 
formation and coordination of interests and preferences among the state actors before 
they evolve to create common interests at regionallevel. 
179Fawcett, "Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History ofRegionalism", pp. 442-445. 
180He, "East Asian Ideas of Regionali sm: A Normative Cri tique", p . 119. 
88 
As shown above, a series of talks over CJK FT A have already laid a ground for 
creating a channel of communication in which respective interests of the three states 
can be coordinated. The Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat was the first to be cited as 
an example to that effect. Creation of such organization is to materialize the vision of 
co-prosperity in Northeast Asia, although it still requires further efforts to produce 
concrete results. Ad van cement of negotiation over tri lateral agreement along the path 
of intensifying economie integration will inevitably touch upon such sensitive issues 
as nationalism, rivalry over power between China and Japan, and inter-Korean 
conflicts. Although CJK FTA may not resolve existing disputes immediately, the 
efforts to institutionalize economie cooperation can lead to positive effects to 
coordinate the interests and common policies of the member states if the three states 
move forward at current pace. 
CONCLUSION 
Northeast Asia is where the legacy of the Cold War era still vividly exists. There are 
constant competitions over military build-up among the states in the region. The size 
of military, the number of warplanes, armored vehicles and aircraft careers are 
frequently compared. Missile launches are proudly announced and counter launches 
follow. At the same time, economie relations among them have been in constant 
growth, raising importance of this region in the global economy. Northeast Asia is a 
region where fragmented politics coexist with integrating economies, which belongs 
to the "Modern Sphere" where democracy or market economy is in a state of 
imperfection according to Tanaka's description. Regionalism in Northeast Asia began 
to draw attention only after the Asian financial crisis in 1997, after realizing the 
necessity to protect themselves within the region in times of emergency. Japan and 
South Korea, formerly strong advocates of multilateralism in international trades, 
began to pursue actively regional agreements since then. The rush toward exclusive 
trade agreements took place throughout East Asia to an extent of creating the 
"spaghetti bowl effect". 
Comparedwith the deepening relations of interdependency, however, the pace of 
integration in the region has been quite slow. Rather, constant disputes over territorial 
issues, subsequent threats toward one another, and rivalry over power have not ceased 
to continue. During the East Asia Summit held in Phnom Penh in November 2012, an 
official commencement of CJK FTA talks was declared. However, it was the trade 
ministers of the three states that made the declaration without the presence of the 
heads of respective states. The territorial disputes among them that preceded the 
meeting prevented the leaders from making the declaration. The shaky 
commencement of CJK FTA as such symbolizes the difficulties lying ahead in the 
path of concluding the eventual agreement despite the pressing necessity. Liberalists 
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may explain theinsufficient level of intra-regional economie cooperation by pointing 
toinactive supranational interest groups or poli ti cal incapability of the member states. 
Neo-realists may explain the reason with the existence of insecurity, insufficient 
formation of security community, competition over hegemonie powers between 
China and Japan, Jack of leadership, existence of US's interests and so forth. Sorne 
may bring to our attention theheterogeneous characteristics of each state and the gap 
of understanding of history, whichexplain the slow pace of the Northeast Asian 
regionalism. Added to the current problematic issues, there came a heated debate over 
the territorial disputes . These developments are often intensified by nationalism, 
which is at times mobilized intentionally by respective governments. In general, there 
are economie factors that accelerate cooperation on one hand and political factors that 
frequently bring ali the cooperative efforts to a hait on the other in Northeast Asia. 
Despite the unrelenting tensions in the realm of political relations, this studydeals 
with the possibility of regional integration, building on the progress of economie 
interdependence achieved so far. Sorne tangible outcomes include the annual summit 
talks, which started in 2008 as part of the ASEAN + 3 meeting, and the creation of 
the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat, which addresses the pending issues related to 
the three states. The most salient achievement, however, is the initiation of an official 
negotiation over the trilateral free trade agreement participated by the three 
governments. This negotiation carries significance because it will position itself as 
the first major institutionalization of a tri lateral economie cooperation in the region. 
Ali socio-political environment can be characterized by the "logic of consequence" 
and the "logic of appropriateness." 181 With the logic of consequence, a behavior is the 
result of rational calculation, while with the logic of appropriateness it is the 
181James G. Marchand Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of 
Politics (New York etc.: The Free press, 1989), pp.24-26. 
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consequence of rules and identities. The former lays focus on how to max1m1ze 
interests while the latter emphasizes how to behave in a specifie situation. Following 
the logic of constructivism, Northeast Asia may not imrnediately alter the current 
international structure of conflicts, or anarchical situation, but the possibility is open 
to change such situation via joint-efforts of the regional states into a more cooperative 
and friendlier one. Compared with the realist and liberalist approaches, 
constructivism can be classified as the logic of consequence, viewing international 
relations as formation of intersubjectivity among social actors. Current international 
order in Northeast Asia is formed by the late 20th century international orders, 
especially post-Cold War period. Nevertheless, it is likely that the increasing 
interdependency in economie area will alter current individual state's identity politics 
that presupposes division and exclusion. As we have already witnessed, concrete 
form of cooperation began to emerge as shown by such cases as the Trilateral 
Cooperation Secretariat and the Trilateral Summit Meetings. A successful launch of 
the CJK FT A will,therefore, mark the first step toward the formation of common 
interests and collective identityfor the three member states. What remains ahead is to 
guard it against the negative impacts from the political front and keep it going to 
produce results. What is important is how the interactions among the three states can 
push them toward a relation of "friends" from current "competitor" relation, and 
create a sense of regional comrnunity. In that regard, the CJK FT A is expected to 
form an institutional framework for creating a sense of regional community and 
collective identity in Northeast Asia. 
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